The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation by Frankel, Tamar
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 83 
Issue 4 Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, and Institutional Investors 
2005 
The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management 
Regulation 
Tamar Frankel 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 939 (2005). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3 
This F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the 
Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
939 
 
 
THE SCOPE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
TAMAR FRANKEL* 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay reviews three periods of investment company regulation by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”). It focuses on 
the period of 1975 to 2000 in which the Commission granted exemptions 
on conditions, thus deregulating and reregulating, case-by-case and finally 
codifying the exemptions in an exemptive rule. The Essay analyzes this 
form of rule-making and compares it to prosecution, settlements, and 
initial rule-making that typifies the recent years. The Essay concludes that 
the common law method of legislation, especially when it involves a 
“bargain” between the regulators and law-abiding regulated institutions 
who wish to innovate, is likely to lead to optimal rules, provided the 
conditions (re-regulation) are rigorously enforced. 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent avalanche of Securities and Exchange Commission rules is 
no usual initiative. Rather, it is a turning point in the history and the 
jurisprudence of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulation of 
investment companies. Three periods emerge in the regulation of 
investment companies and their advisers. The first period, from 1940 to 
about 1974, starts with the passage of the Investment Company Act 
(“1940 Act”) and Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”).1 The period 
can be characterized as a strict regulatory period, beginning with setting 
the regulatory house in order and then applying and enforcing the acts. 
The Commission engaged mostly in individual exemptions. On a rare 
occasion it passed a regulation, such as adjusting the 1940 Act to 
insurance companies’ separate account and variable annuities.2  
 * Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
Presented at the conference jointly sponsored by the Washington University School of Law and the 
Institute for Law and Economic Policy, April 9–10, 2005. 
 1. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).  
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 270.6e-2 (2005). 
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The 1975 to 2000 period was a period of cooperation between the 
Commission and mutual fund managers (“Managers”). It was a period of 
encouraging innovations by deregulation coupled with re-regulation. Most 
individual and rule exemptions during those years adjusted the 1940 Act 
and the Advisers Act in response to requests by the industry to permit new 
arrangements, new forms of funds, and new financial offerings.3 Few 
Commission releases were interpretative in nature, such as Release 1092 
interpreting the Advisers Act and its application to financial planners.4 
Congress reviewed the 1940 Act and the Advisers Act periodically, and 
some of the Commission’s rules were incorporated and codified in these 
acts.5 During this period there developed a remarkable staff scholarship, 
which contained historical materials, empirical research and theoretical 
analysis.6 
The period starting in 2001 marked a different approach by the 
Commission. The Commission did not retreat to the 1940s. Neither did it 
remain in the recent past. This Essay explores the nature of the new type 
of regulation, its origins and reasons, and its new form and approach. I 
conclude that, in light of the size of the mutual funds and the period of 
1990s there was no escape from this new regulatory era. I also conclude 
that the new type of regulation, although it is likely to be more effective 
than that of the past, may not solve the deep-seated problem of the 
investment management profession unless the culture of the money 
Managers changes as well.7 Short-term, however, the new type of 
regulation accompanied by prosecution may follow the “common law” 
form of the 1975 to 2000 era, which may have been the “golden age” of 
mutual funds and their Managers. 
 3. See Appendix A. 
 4. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and 
Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial 
Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400 (Oct. 16, 1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
 5. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000); Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000). 
 6. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. S.E.C., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION (1992).  
 7. The current era is sometimes coined “managerial capitalism” in which the managers assert 
property rights to their power to manage other people’s money. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A 
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 60 (1992) (noting that “the 
historian Alfred Chandler declared in 1977 that America had created a system of ‘Managerial 
Capitalism’”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
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I. FROM 1940 TO 1974: ESTABLISHING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Throughout the thirty-five year period from 1940 to 1974 the 
Commission issued 113 rules. Of these rules thirteen were definitional. 
Thirty-five rules detailed the forms which applicants should use. Four 
rules dealt with books and records; three covered custody of assets (one of 
which contained a clarification); and the other fifty-eight provided 
exemptions from various sections of the 1940 Act, detailed conditions for 
compliance, and made adjustments of the securities acts to the special 
needs of mutual funds.8 It is important to note that during the entire period 
the investment management profession did not exceed 431 funds, and 
roughly $60 billion under management.9 The rules indicate the 
Commission’s approach. It received significant authority of a unique kind 
and was setting the regulatory house in order. During this period, it did not 
provide many permissions for innovative activities that conflicted with the 
provisions of the 1940 Act and the Advisers Act.10 
By and large, regulation did not interfere much in market activities, and 
when it did, it took the form of limiting market activities and requiring 
strict adherence to the letter of the law. Thus, periodic payment plans—the 
sale of mutual fund shares by installment—died when the Commission 
limited the incentives of the salespersons to sell such plans to people who 
could not continue payments and who lost their initial payments by the 
sales load.11 The Commission did not act to revive the number of face-
amount certificate companies. Similarly, of face-amount certificate 
companies, the number has shrunk as other more attractive plans 
emerged.12 
This does not suggest that the profession did not innovate. It suggests 
that the innovations were possible within the parameters of the Acts. It 
also suggests that the Managers were engaged in maintaining and 
 8. See Appendix B. 
 9. See Appendix A. 
 10. E.g., Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 24,816 (Jan. 2, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified in scattered sections of 
17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2005)); Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520 (July 27, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 270 (2005)); Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. §§ 275.203(b)(3)-1, -2 (2005)). 
 11. See 4 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 28.01, at 28-5 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 12. See Larry D. Barnett, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Names and the Societal Role of Trust: 
An Exploration of Section 35(d) of the Investment Company Act, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 345, 
349 n.20 (2005) (“Few face-amount certificate companies appear to exist today.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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strengthening their weak position as financial intermediaries. During that 
period advisers were engaged in protecting their turf. Through their 
organization, the Investment Company Institute, they fought in the courts 
for the maintenance of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prevented banks 
from advertising the services of bank trust departments as investment 
management entities and engaging in mutual fund-like businesses.13 The 
Commission was active as well. It asserted its jurisdiction over separate 
accounts, created by life insurance companies to offer variable annuities 
and variable life insurance policies.14 
Few innovations required changes in the law and few innovators sought 
the Commission’s exemption. One basis for this conclusion is the 
relatively few requests for no-action letters, especially at the beginning of 
the period. Not only were they few, but they were also not well publicized. 
The publication of no-action letters started only at the beginning of the 
1970s.15 No-action letters did not gain the power of precedent until later, 
when lawyers and clients realized that no-action letters give the actors a 
partial protection for activities that would otherwise be legally too risky.16 
These no-action letters provide a semi-declaratory judgment for a new 
venture. That protection became even stronger when the courts gave the 
letters credence against claims by private plaintiffs.17 The Commission 
announced its support for these letters and promised to avoid, as much as 
possible, revoking the letters even prospectively.18 The staff encouraged 
requests for letters as a means of learning about proposed market 
innovations, as a mechanism of reducing undesirable activities, and as a 
method of expressing the staff’s interpretation about the law.19  
 13. See Financial Services Industry: Hearing on H.R. 3054, H.R. 4441, and H.R. 5777 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 101st 
Comm. 589 (1990) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
 14. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that a separate 
account established by the insurance company to fund variable annuities was subject to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940). 
 15. Adoption of Section 200.81 (17 CFR 200.81), Concerning Public Availability of Requests for 
No-Action and Interpretative Letters and the Responses Thereto by the Commission’s Staff, and 
Amendment of Section 200.80 (17 CFR 200.80) Securities Act Release No. 5098 (Oct. 29, 1970) 
(codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 200.80 (2005)). 
 16. See 4 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 2.12[C], at 2-78 to -80 (2001 & Supp. 2003). 
 17. See 1 id. § 2.12[D], at 2-80 to -81 (2001). 
 18. See Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1319, 1352–53 (1998) (noting precedential value SEC and staff place on no-action 1etters). 
 19. Id. at 1351. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
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The only two path-breaking innovations that took place during that 
period were the introduction of variable annuities by investment 
companies, and the creation of money market funds. In the case of variable 
annuities, the Commission fought to assert its jurisdiction over the new 
creations.20 In the case of money market funds, the Commission supported 
the innovation.21 The support was direly needed. The profession and its 
mutual funds were subjected to the volatile securities markets. In both 
cases, the model of mutual funds and the advisory profession had rubbed 
shoulders with the established financial intermediaries, the insurance 
companies and the banks. And in both cases, inflation or the concern about 
inflation and regulation of insurance and banking helped. The insurance 
companies wanted to enter the field when they were losing market share.22 
The banks were losing depositors because they were not allowed to pay 
more than 5¼% on their savings account (and the savings and loan 
associations were not allowed to pay more than 5½%) during a period of 
double digit inflation.23 The Commission retained its jurisdiction over 
variable annuity contracts, and helped advisers establish and develop 
money market funds, alternatives to bank deposits, including shares that 
could be redeemed by the stroke of a pen over a bank check.24 
Investors were active in the courts. The issues are familiar today. The 
1950s brought cases on the fees charged by advisers to mutual funds.25 
The 1960s brought cases on “give ups” and other pressures to enhance and 
finance the sale of mutual fund shares.26 In the 1970s, section 36(b) of the 
 20. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 21. TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 465 
(3d ed. 2005) (“The SEC started regulating money market funds in the beginning of 1972 by imposing 
conditions linked to the exemptions from the market valuation requirements and [Investment Company 
Act] Section 19 [15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (2000)].”); id. at 464 (noting necessity for funds’ exemption from 
sections 19(a), (b) [15 U.S.C. § 80a-19(a), (b) (2000)]. Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act, 
adopted in 1983, codified exemptions from the market valuation requirements. Valuation of Debt 
Instruments and Computation of Current Price Per Share by Certain Open-End Investment Companies 
(Money Market Funds), Investment Company Act Release No. 13,380 (July 11, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 
32,555 (July 18, 1983) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2005)) (permitting money 
market funds to use either penny-rounding or amortized cost valuation or pricing methods).  
 22. Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate Accounts, 51 B.U. L. 
REV. 173, 177–79 (1971). 
 23. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1986) (expired 1986). 
 24. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text; Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market 
Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,589 (July 17, 1990), 55 Fed. Reg. 30,239, 30,240 
(July 25, 1990) (“Many money market funds allow investors to use checks to redeem shares . . . .”). 
 25. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (Del. 1962); see 2 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, 
THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 12.03[D], at 12-76 to -97 (2001) (citing cases). 
 26. See 2 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 12.03[C], at 12-71 (2001) (noting give-ups). 
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Investment Company Act was added by Congress relating to fees.27 In 
sum, the first thirty-five years of the Commission’s reign are characterized 
by a weak and small management advisory profession, relatively few 
mutual funds, and the Commission’s support of two important innovations 
by granting conditional exemptions.  
II. FROM 1975 TO 2000: REGULATION FOR GROWTH 
Some fundamental changes occurred in the mutual funds area during 
the 1975 to 2000 period. During that period, the Commission issued 203 
rules. Fifteen rules related to definitions; forty rules covered forms and 
filing, four rules dealt with books and records. Twelve regulated custody 
of assets and 132 related to substantive exemptions.28 One change in that 
period was the enormous increase of the number of mutual funds (and 
closed end-funds) and the magnitude of the assets under management.29 At 
the end of 1974, the total net assets of mutual funds was $46 billion; at the 
end of 2000 it had reached $12 trillion.30 The causes of this growth are not 
easy to pinpoint, or prove.  
One may speculate that mutual fund growth was tied to the new 
resources that became available to finance the broker dealers and 
underwriters who sold fund shares. Former rules that limited these 
financing sources were changed to allow more money resources to flow to 
the sellers of mutual fund shares. The changed rules were based on a 
number of theoretical innovations. For example, the principle guiding the 
advisers’ fee measures has changed. Before the change, advisers were 
viewed as professionals whose compensation reflected the value of their 
services. On this basis, advisers were not able to use part of their fees to 
pay brokers who sold fund shares.31 If the advisers spent part of the fees on 
compensating brokers who sold fund shares or on paying solicitors for 
business, it meant that the advisers were willing to accept a lower fee for 
their services. Hence, the amount of fees they were charging was 
considered excessive.  
This view has changed. Now, the advisers are viewed as operating a 
business. As businesses they are entitled to profits. With their profits they 
can do whatever they wish, including making payments to brokers for the 
 27. Investment Company Act Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, sec. 36(b), 84 
Stat. 1413, 1429–30 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000)). 
 28. See Appendix C. 
 29. For the number of investment companies and their net assets see Appendix A. 
 30. For the net assets of investment companies see Appendix A. 
 31. Tamar Frankel, Advisory Fees: Evolving Theories, 10 INV. LAW. 22 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
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sale of fund shares. Therefore, even if they made such payments they did 
not necessarily charge excessive fees.32 That theory released some of the 
advisory fees for payment to brokers who sold fund shares. With increased 
financing, the funds and the assets under management grew. 
In 1981, a new source of paying brokers who sold fund shares opened 
up: the assets of the funds themselves. Rule 12b-1 allowed the boards of 
fund directors to approve a program which financed the sale of the funds’ 
shares.33 Even if the fund is closed to new investors, it still might charge to 
avoid “net redemptions.”34 More recently there has been the change in the 
formula under which brokers who sold fund shares would be paid. Not 
only commissions, but also part of the advisory fees could, and did, pass to 
the salespersons.35 In 1986, small brokers (who sold fund shares) could 
provide advisers with soft dollar benefits, which they could purchase.36 
Having provided the soft dollars, these brokers could receive brokerage 
business, which they could then farm out to other brokers who could 
perform the task (and show their gratitude to the small brokers by a 
discount). Currently, advisers pay brokers for “shelf space,” a prominent 
space in the brokers’ display of funds to their clients.37 In sum, during this 
period, the amount of money that flowed to brokers who sold mutual fund 
shares increased dramatically, as did the amounts of assets under advisers’ 
management. 
A. Deregulation and Re-Regulation by Conditions 
The exemptions during the 1975 to 2000 period contained conditions. 
The conditions imposed three main types of requirements. One 
requirement involves disclosure, such as Form N-1A under the 1940 Act 
and Form ADV under the Advisers Act.38 On its face, the disclosure 
 32. See 2 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 12.03[C], at 12-71 (2001) (noting payments to brokers). 
 33. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005).  
 34. See Russ Wiles, Why Closed Portfolios Levy 12b-1 Is Open to Question, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
1998, at D3 (“There’s nothing illegal about maintaining a 12b-1 fee on a fund that decides to close its 
doors to new money . . . .”). 
 35. Securities; Brokerage and Research Services, Exchange Act Release No. 23,170, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 16,004 (Apr. 30, 1986) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2005)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation Requirements for 
Transactions in Mutual Funds, College Savings Plans, and Certain Other Securities, and Amendments 
to the Registration Form for Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,778 (Feb. 28, 
2005), 70 Fed. Reg. 10,521, 10541 n.86 (Mar. 4, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 274) 
(noting recent enforcement actions against advisers for failure to disclose shelf space arrangements).  
 38. Form N-1A, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2005); Form 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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requirements are similar to those under the Securities Act of 1933.39 
Substantively, however, the disclosure follows not the model of a sales 
contract but the model of fiduciary law. As discussed below, the disclosure 
reflects the principle that Managers are fiduciaries, on whom the clients 
rely. Therefore Managers should offer their clients information that is 
relevant to the clients rather than wait for the clients to ask them for this 
information. Form ADV clearly reflects this approach. It requires advisers 
to disclose not only the fees they charge but also whether these fees are 
extraordinarily higher than the normal fees, setting the maximum at three 
percent of the managed assets.40  
The second type of condition in the exemptions is conditions that 
impose structural changes in the mutual funds, focused mainly on internal 
controls. For example, Rule 12b-1 requires the approval of the 
disinterested board of directors for a plan that would allow the Managers 
to charge funds up to a certain percentage of the fund assets for the 
purpose of financing the sale of funds’ shares and providing services to 
investors.41  
In addition, this rule introduces a structural change by increasing the 
number of disinterested directors.42 While the necessary approval of the 
board relates to the particular Rule 12b-1 plan, the requirement to increase 
the percentage of disinterested directors changes the structure of the board 
not only for the particular decision, but for all board decisions as well. The 
board consists of more disinterested directors in all other matters.  
During the 1975 to 2000 period, the structural conditions appeared as a 
condition to other exemptions, including those concerning conflict of 
interest transactions. Unlike corporate law, which authorizes independent 
directors to approve conflict of interest transactions by interested directors, 
the 1940 Act prohibited such conflicts, subject only to exemptions by the 
Commission.43 During the period of 1975–2000, the Commission passed a 
number of exemptions from the conflict of interest prohibitions in the 
1940 Act, conditioned on, among other things, the approval by a large 
percentage of disinterested directors.44  
The 1940 Act also differs from corporate law in its definition of 
directors’ independence. Independent directors under corporate law are 
ADV, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).  
 39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000). 
 40. See Charles Meyer, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 4, 1975) (noting staff position).  
 41. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).   
 44. See Appendix C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
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directors who have no personal stake in the conflict of interest transaction 
at issue.45 Under the 1940 Act, however, disinterested directors are not 
only independent in this sense, but must also satisfy a status requirement 
of independence from the Managers-Advisers and their affiliates.46 Only 
recently has the New York Stock Exchange rule imposed similar “status 
conflict of interest prohibitions” on directors of corporations whose shares 
are traded on the Exchange.47 
The reason for shifting the decision from the Commission to the board 
is not hard to find. In the 1980s, the number of mutual funds increased 
significantly and with it the number of requests for exemption. The staff of 
the Commission did not increase sufficiently to meet the demand. The 
solution was to delegate the decision regarding some conflicts to the fund 
boards, under certain conditions. In the case of some exemptions, the 
delegation was accompanied by a required increase in the number of 
disinterested directors, as in the case of Rule 12b-1.48 
The third kind of condition that accompanied exemptions during the 
1975 to 2000 period consisted of direct and specific regulation of the 
funds’ investments and activities. For example, Rule 2a-749 contains 
detailed limitations on permissible investments of money market funds. 
The conditions were based on the policy of preventing misleading 
impressions, not merely by disclosure, but also by ensuring that money 
market funds will likely be able to meet the investors’ justified 
expectations. If a share looked like a bank deposit, it had to be backed by 
conservative investments to ensure that the implied promise of low risk 
would in fact be met.  
In addition to ensuring that money market funds will meet their implied 
obligations, the rule was based on a concern for systemic risk. Like bank 
demand deposits, money market funds offer very quick redemptions. 
Similar to “money in the bank,” investors could view the shares of these 
funds as a promise to receive on redemption at least the amount of dollars 
that the investors invested. Therefore, if the funds “broke the dollar,” that 
is, if the funds paid investors less than the amounts that the investors 
 45. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.2.3, at 331 (2000) (stating that most 
corporate law conflict-of-interest statutes “state what transactions they cover” rather than define 
“disinterested director”). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (2000). 
 47. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745 (Nov. 4, 2003), 68 Fed. 
Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003), codified as amended at NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (Westlaw through Feb. 11, 2004). 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005). 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2005). 
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invested in the funds, the funds were exposed to a greater possibility of 
investor “runs.” Legally, investors are not entitled to receive the dollars 
they invested in these funds. Their investments are equity. They are 
shares, not bonds or notes. But because the funds look and appear to be 
like bank deposits, the investors’ assumption is that the funds would 
assure repayment of the money they put into the funds. And fund 
Managers are just as concerned about “runs” if the investors are 
disappointed on this count. Thus, the regulation of money market funds 
ensured that the less concerned Managers will not be permitted to compete 
by providing higher returns at higher risk. In such situations the 
developing “run” (a cascade) could contaminate not only the particular 
money market funds, but also other money market funds that have not 
broken the dollar. 
B. The Open Door to Innovations 
Throughout the period from 1975 to 2000, the Commission adopted 
203 rules.50 These rules relaxed the provisions of the Acts, subject to 
conditions, thus allowing advisers to change the sales and redemption cost 
allocations and payments by investors.51 In addition, the rules allowed for 
new investment arrangements, periodic repurchase by closed-end funds of 
their shares,52 and creating exchange-traded funds, which are a new form 
of fund, part open-end and part closed-end.53 Strict prohibitions on fund of 
funds structures were relaxed,54 as were investments that could be 
interpreted as leverage (prohibited in the Act).55 Market timing was left 
loosely to disclosure and prohibited discrimination, and the strict 
prohibitions were relaxed to overcome “stale pricing” and administrative 
problems in collating orders of thousands of investors in 401(k) plans and 
others.56 The recognition of “funds” that have no specific legal form as 
investment companies, as held in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. 
SEC,57 was expanded in a no-action letter to “tracking stocks” that may 
have had just the effect of informal separate accounts.58  
 50. See Appendix C. 
 51. See Appendix C. 
 52. 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-3 (2005). 
 53. See Appendix C. 
 54. See Appendix C. 
 55. See Appendix C. 
 56. See Appendix C. 
 57. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964). 
 58. Comdisco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 25, 2000) (the tracking stocks did not promise 
buyers much but allowed the boards to grant them more. The staff, however, increased the risk of such 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
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The Commission recognized new entities that fell within the definition 
of an investment company, but were not traditional investment companies, 
and granted exemptions that culminated later in rules, such as Rule 3c-8 
under the 1940 Act.59 A significant number of exemptions by rules were 
promulgated to authorize the boards of directors to approve conflicts of 
interest transactions under certain circumstances.60 
A number of reasons can explain the cooperative environment between 
the Commission and advisers. One reason was the growing strength of the 
profession. Another was the deregulation of banks, the acquisition of one 
type of financial intermediary by another, and the competition among the 
various financial intermediaries (and sometimes their regulators). Yet 
another reason for cooperation was the general atmosphere of encouraging 
innovations that required freedom from constraining regulation, and the 
trust in market discipline to protect investors. The burden on the regulators 
and the regulated was shifting from “show me why an exemption should 
be granted” to “show me why not?”  
C. Controls Over Temptation 
While the amounts under management have grown enormously, and 
the activities of the advisory profession have become increasingly varied, 
the system of controlling temptations and the resources devoted to controls 
over the Advisers remained more or less the same. In 1996, the regulation 
of smaller advisers was relegated to the states, and the Commission 
remained mostly in charge of advisers that managed no less than $25 
million.61 The Commission’s Compliance Office (“Office”) refined its 
supervision by selective examinations targeted to danger signals that it 
developed based on statistical data. But the Office has not fundamentally 
changed the manner in which the examinations were carried out nor did 
Congress increase significantly the number of examiners. Mutual funds 
were required to establish a Code of Ethics that targeted mainly insider 
trading by employees of the mutual funds.62 But basically the monitoring 
and enforcement of the law remained the same throughout the period. 
structures by announcing that it will no longer offer no-action letters on the structures). 
 59. See Appendix C. 
 60. See Appendix C. 
 61. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, sec. 303(a), 
§ 203A, 110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2000)).  
 62. Prevention of Certain Unlawful Activities with Respect to Registered Investment Companies, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 11,421, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,915, 73,919 (Nov. 7, 1980) (codified as 
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c) (2005)).  
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D. Interpretation of the Law 
One of the additional changes that have occurred throughout this period 
is the approach to interpretation of the 1940 Act and the Advisers Act. 
Past interpretations followed a line of questions, such as: (1) What was the 
problem that the law was designed to prevent or reduce? (2) How is a 
“problem” defined, that is, what is bad about the certain behavior? (3) 
What options were open to Congress and the Commission? and (4) What 
option was chosen and why? New situations were interpreted in light of 
the answers, and the Commission attempted to allow certain activities so 
long as the problems which Congress envisioned were reduced or 
eliminated in some other way.  
As I see it, since the mid-1980s and especially during the 1990s, a 
different approach developed in interpreting the law. The words of the 
Acts were interpreted sometimes by resorting to the dictionary, sometimes 
by seeking the interpretation in precedents. If the words did not prohibit a 
certain behavior, then the behavior would be permitted. The tendency was 
to seek specificity of rules.63 Gray areas would be inefficient and create 
uncertainty. Gray areas may impose legal risks and thus limit the ability of 
the Advisers and other fiduciaries to create value for themselves. To be 
sure, they should not cross the line to a prohibited behavior, but anything 
that is not prohibited should be permitted. This approach led to the style of 
specific regulation. Details were increased and activities that involve 
discretion were addressed by regulation more specifically. Whatever was 
not addressed, however, would be permitted, or in the case of doubt, there 
was a good argument that the behavior should be permitted.64 
This approach led to efficiencies in the benefits to fiduciaries, but also 
to great inefficiencies in enforcing prohibitions on fraud. Indeed, when the 
gray areas were eliminated, the rules offered more value to the fiduciaries. 
But having eliminated the gray areas, the rules made enforcement 
enormously expensive. Market timing, which has achieved much 
notoriety, is a perfect example. The practice hurt the portfolio Managers 
by making it more difficult to plan investment policies. The practice also 
reduced the advisers’ fees by the funds’ less optimal performance. These 
considerations were sufficient to require the funds to disclose their policies 
 63. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (interpreting private 
placement in § 4(2) of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000)); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 
(2005). 
 64. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 146–49 (2006). 
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concerning market timing, and leaving the Advisers to enforce their 
disclosed rules.65 But if no disclosure was made, there were lawyers and 
other advisers who assumed that the practice was fine. Advisers benefited 
from contracts offering preferred client-to-market time and causing 
expense to the remainder of the investors. Most importantly, some 
advisers also assumed that their organization and even they personally 
may benefit from this practice.66 
Paradoxically, the approach of specificity has blurred a fundamental 
and very simple principle, the principle on which all fiduciary rules are 
based: The money which Managers manage is other people’s money. All 
benefits from controlling and managing the money do not belong to the 
Managers, except the amounts that are specifically allocated to the 
Managers by a specific clear agreement. If there is no such agreement, 
there is no benefit to the Managers. Specificity of interpretation shifted 
attention from the reason for the rules to the words of the rules, and from 
the words of the rules to the world outside the words—a vast expanse of 
opportunities for the advisers and fiduciaries to benefit from their 
managerial power. 
In addition, in the corporate area the simple principle that managers are 
not the owners of the money they manage was turned on its head. The 
principle was refocused. The emphasis was no longer that the managers do 
not own the money they manage. The emphasis was refocused on the 
investors’—“other people’s”—entitlement.67 Were these other people 
really the owners? Or were they lenders of risk capital? When attention is 
focused on who owns the money instead of on the principle that managers 
do not own the money, a wide vista of possibilities to satisfy temptations 
arises.  
This change was supported by an academic movement that redefined 
fiduciary duties as contracts.68 The relationship between the manager and 
 65. See Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: 
Market Timing (Feb. 2005) (on file with author).  
 66. See In re Putnam Investment Mgmt., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,232 (Nov. 11, 
2003); 1 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 
§ 1.02[B], at 1-82 (Supp. 2005) (discussing market timing); Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market Timing (Feb. 2005) (on file with author).  
 67. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 59, 90 (2003). See also, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 515(a)(1), 1715(a)(1) (West 1995) (in the context of takeovers) (stating that directors may 
consider interests not only of shareholders but also of “employees, suppliers, customers and creditors 
of the corporation, and . . . communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are 
located”).  
 68. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425, 427 (1993). 
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the investor was recast as a contract in which the manager undertakes 
certain duties. The duties may be described in more or less general terms. 
The important part is that once the money is handed over to the manager 
its ownership changes hands. The corporation that received the money is 
the owner and the manager who acts for the corporation is its controlling 
agent. By this metamorphosis, the managers ceased to hold the investors’ 
money and became the holders of the corporation’s money. They ceased to 
owe fiduciary duties to the investors. Investors became creditors with 
entitlement under a contract only. Managers owed duties to the 
corporations—that they managed. Most importantly, if the managers 
breached their duties to investors, the breaches were far less reprehensible. 
There was no accounting for profits and no stigma of abuse of trust. 
Besides, the managers represented the corporations that would be hurt by 
their own actions. Accountability for their actions was presumably left for 
the markets. 
In sum, there were two major developments throughout this period: 
First, managers were liable only for violating specific rules. The principles 
underlying the rules were abandoned. Second, investors were no longer 
beneficial owners of the money they handed to the managers. They 
became lenders of risk capital. They were entitled to contract remedies but 
no trust remedies. They had to depend on the market for security of their 
money. In this environment and its theoretical underpinnings, Managers 
may indeed benefit from the money that is handed over to them so long as 
the investors receive something that the Seventh Circuit in one case called 
“market” return.69  
III. FROM 2001 TO THE PRESENT 
The first scandal related to mutual funds concerned market timing.70 
But at first blush many did not consider it a “scandal.” Under some 
conditions market timing is permissible.71 The wrongful practices were not 
embezzlement or direct cheating. The problem, however, loomed large 
 69. Wsol v. Fiduciary Mgmt. Assocs., 266 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 
(2002). The fact that the managers benefited (for example, by receiving additional $260 million to 
manage) was not enough to create a remedy under fiduciary law.  
 70. 1 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 
§ 1.02[B], at 1-82 (Supp. 2005) (discussing market timing). 
 71. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Market Holdings, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,287 (Dec. 11, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,404 (Dec. 17, 
2003) (“Market timing itself is not illegal. However, market timing may dilute the value of long-term 
shareholders’ interests in a mutual fund if the fund calculates NAV using closing prices that are no 
longer accurate.”). 
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when it occurred to many that what counted was not the amount that the 
Managers indirectly (by kickback) or directly took from their investors. It 
was that the Managers benefited from money that was entrusted to them. 
Knowing human nature, starting small is just the beginning. Started by one 
rogue unregulated Manager, the practice was followed by dozens of 
regulated fund Managers.72 A permissive culture in the advisers’ 
organization can frighten some investors. It did.73  
Throughout the past three years the Commission has issued eighty-
seven rules and is proposing more rules that address the enforcement of 
the law. Four rules were definitional, five related to forms and filing, three 
to books and records, and one to custody of assets. The remaining seventy-
four rules regulated substantively by exemptions and mostly by direct 
imposition of new regulations.74 The rules are structured in a number of 
innovative techniques, and their proposed enforcement controls offer a 
number of innovative approaches. The first rules addressed the issue of 
market timing. Internal controls requirements were tightened, including 
the appointment of a compliance officer who will have significant 
authority and direct access to the board.75 The Commission’s compliance 
staff encourages these internal compliance officers to keep in touch, giving 
them access to the Commission and perhaps increasing their prestige. 
Advisers must prepare and enforce a code of ethics, similar to the code 
required under the 1940 Act, and in both cases the coverage of the code is 
more extensive than the historical one.76  
Other rules aimed at changing the power balance and the structure of 
mutual funds. They increase the number of disinterested directors to 
seventy-five percent of board membership and require that the chairperson 
of the board be a disinterested director.77 They increase the ability of the 
disinterested directors to hire their own staff and lawyers, and to caucus 
 72. Complaint, State v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (Sept. 3, 2003), http://news.findlaw.com/ 
nytimes/docs/nys/nyscanary90303cmp.pdf; 1 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE 
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 1.02[B], at 1-82.1 (Supp. 2005) (citing SEC enforcement 
actions). 
 73. See, e.g., Quality Funds in a Post-Scandal World, BUS. WK. ONLINE, May 18, 2004 (noting 
that investors are avoiding scandal-plagued funds).  
 74. See Appendix D. 
 75. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,299 (Dec. 17, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,729–74,730 (Dec. 24, 
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38a-1(a)(4), 275.206(4)-7 (2005)). 
 76. Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2256, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 41,696, 41,708–41,709 (July 9, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2005)). 
 77. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520 (July 27, 
2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,389–46,390 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 270). 
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among themselves. Disinterested directors have been tasked with a more 
active supervisory role. The balance of power has been changed between 
the advisers who promote and manage mutual funds and view them as 
their business, and the directors who have a more ambivalent role of 
representing and guarding the shareholders’ interests. The intrusion into 
the advisers’ management brought to the fore difficult issues that are not 
yet resolved.  
Changes towards heightened directors’ surveillance is not new. The 
rules have moved constantly towards greater directors’ power, but never 
have they reached the current level of independence and power.78 So long 
as the shareholders do not read the prospectuses and do not make their 
own minds, they must rely on advisers. If these advisers, such as financial 
planners, brokers, and analysts, are paid in one way or another by the 
funds’ Managers, the advisers will tend to recommend to the investors the 
funds that pay them most. Thus, the successful funds are not necessarily 
those that are best managed but those whose Managers pay most for the 
recommendations and sales of these fund shares. So long as the sales 
pressure continues, the pressure will continue on directors to 
independently and objectively evaluate the performance of the fund 
Managers and their fees. That is not necessarily a happy result. For 
effective management, the Managers and the directors should cooperate.  
Another important change is the manner in which the rules are 
fashioned. To be sure, some of the rules are detailed, as they were in the 
past. For example, the imposition of registration requirements on hedge 
fund advisers is quite detailed.79 But with respect to controls and the 
establishment of honesty, the Commission’s approach is somewhat 
different than in the past.  
The rules provide advisers and directors with principles, and then 
require them to disclose the practices that they have established to 
implement these principles. Rather than micro-manage, the Commission 
has invited the advisers to manage controls in a way that would comply 
with and enforce the principles. The Commission identified the 
responsible parties and left to them the implementation of the principles.80 
 78. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2005)). 
 79. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.203(b)(3)-1, -2 (2005). The rule allows the advisers an escape route, such 
as imposing a two-year bar on investors’ withdrawal of their money from the hedge fund. If their 
investors may withdraw their money only after two years and one day, the advisers to hedge funds 
might escape registration. 
 80. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 
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On its face, the fundamental principle that underlies all the laws is not 
complicated nor hard to understand. It can be summarized in four words: 
“It’s not your money.” All the rules, interpretations, and processes are 
aimed at enforcing this principle. The principle does not require advisers 
to give the investors anything that belongs to the advisers. It requires that 
the advisers do not succumb to the temptation to take what does not 
belong to them, regardless of who the owners are. 
Yet, this principle is not as simple to implement as it seems. The issue 
involves the status of those who deal with other people’s money: brokers 
who advise, financial planners who plan for others, fund Managers and 
their compliance officers, lawyers, and accountants. In this day and age all 
these actors occupy a dual position. They are professionals. They operate 
businesses. There is a difference between the two positions. Professionals 
perform a public service first, and strive to make a living second. 
Businesses strive to make a living and maximize profits. As compared to 
businesses, competition among professionals used to be far more 
restrained. After all, all professionals had the public as their client. Self-
restraint and self-regulation were more prevalent in the professional area.81  
These practices and self-image have changed throughout the past thirty 
years. Professions have become more business-oriented and professional 
organizations have become more like trade organizations, fighting to 
protect their turf and increase their members’ profits. Prestige came with 
more pay and competition increased for higher profits. When the measure 
of professional rewards is money, and when no other reward is imagined, 
there is hardly any limit to the drive for more. And when public service 
does not bring money and requires limits on profits, it is natural to ignore 
it.82 
Professionals should not be surprised that their public service 
orientation is now imposed on them by the government, compliance 
officers, directors, and the requirements for codes of ethics. If self-restraint 
is abandoned, coercive restraint comes from outside.  
There are those who question the value of honesty in the mutual fund 
business. Investors, they say, do not value honesty. Investors value the 
money that they receive, that is, performance, regardless of how it is 
(2005)); Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2005)); Registration 
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203(b)(3)-1, -2 (2005))  
 81. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 138–39 (2005). 
 82. See id. at 138. 
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achieved. To be sure, there are probably investors who care not about 
honesty. And yet, in my opinion, if they are rational, investors would like 
to reduce the risk of direct or indirect dishonesty. Besides, poor 
performance can be linked to dishonesty such as unconscionable fees and 
practices that benefit some shareholders and Managers unfairly at the 
expense of others. If the source of poor performance is unknown, it could 
arise from dishonest management. Therefore, at least some rational 
investors might value honesty even if today they benefit by dishonesty; 
tomorrow they might lose by dishonesty.  
Not all Managers value honesty either. The following story is 
demonstrative. It was rumored that Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s examiners would form monitoring groups. These groups 
would sit at the offices of large mutual fund Managers, and supervise their 
operations, the way FDIC agents sit at large bank offices. Asked for a 
reaction to this action, I was told in confidence how a senior Manager in 
one large fund complex reacted. He said something like: “That is sheer 
waste of money. No one would speak to these monitors and they will be 
put in a box and forgotten.” I was astounded. Here was a golden 
opportunity to gain the best guarantee of honesty at no cost. It was an 
opportunity to show the world and the regulators that this fund complex 
had nothing to hide. I expected the Managers to receive the government 
monitors with open arms, show them around, and offer them a comfortable 
office from which to supervise and hopefully report and advertise the fund 
complex’s compliance with the law. This Manager did not expect the 
investors to value trust. 
A. The Virtue of the Common Law Approach 
If investors read their prospectuses they would exert market pressure 
on their advisers and substitute for government interference. How can the 
Commission ensure that investors receive truthful information and 
convince investors to read it and exert market pressure on advisers? The 
objective, after all, is to inform investors without influencing them one 
way or another, and let them make up their own mind. Yet, by definition, 
information influences, and can be true to some readers and misleading to 
others. And investors do not do their homework and continue to rely on 
others.  
How can law strengthen the directors’ supervision over the advisers 
without harming the cooperation among them? The objective is to render 
the advisers accountable but also create an on-going, non-hostile, 
cooperative environment among the two parties for the benefit of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
p 939 Frankel book pages.doc4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] JURISPRUDENCE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 957 
 
 
 
 
 
 
investors and the advisers. Yet, by definition, supervision and cooperation 
are rarely fully compatible, especially when the advisers bear the cost of 
restrictions on their profitability. 
How can internal controls be established in an environment of 
competition among the mutual fund advisers? The objective, after all, is 
not to reduce competition but to eliminate or at least restrict competition 
by dishonest behavior. Yet, legitimate and legal competition on one hand, 
and dishonest behavior on the other hand, are not always clearly 
distinguishable.  
And how can the law and the government induce advisers not only to 
prepare codes of ethics but also to inculcate their organizations with a 
culture of self-limiting honesty? Such a culture is the most efficient, for it 
does not involve enforcement costs. Yet, it is the hardest to achieve and 
maintain. 
We do not know the answers to these questions. Permissive rules or lax 
enforcement can fail. Strong intrusive rules and strict enforcement may not 
be optimal either. They can induce the advisers to “go underground,” or go 
abroad, or use political pressure to relax the rules. Much can depend on the 
particular individuals, the history of the organizations, and the talents of 
the Managers and actors. The same rules may be effective for some fund 
complexes and ineffective for others. The costs of these rules may differ. 
Optimal rules that apply to all may be different from custom-made rules, 
and less costly. 
To be sure, the Commission can enact a rule and then conduct 
empirical studies to uncover its defects, costs and benefits, and adjust the 
rule accordingly. But even this method is not likely to bring the desired 
results. The actors are not frozen in time. Their behavior changes 
continually, not only by the rule but also by new events, different 
environments, and other internal and external conditions. Therefore, the 
effects and costs of new rules as compared to previous rules will be highly 
speculative.  
Historically, the Commission used a number of mechanisms that 
produced results like those of the common law. The approach resulted in 
relatively optimal rules (even if their enforcement was not optimal). These 
mechanisms facilitated flexible, case-by-case experiments and decisions, 
which culminated in rules. The Commission’s staff issued no-action letters 
on a case-by-case basis.83 When the no-action letters contained 
 83. See, e.g., Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act 
Release No. 39,538 (Jan. 12, 1998), 63 Fed. Reg. 2854, 2857 n.27 (Jan. 16, 1998) (noting that 
amendment codifies prior no-action position). 
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interpretations of the law they served as precedents and guidance to 
lawyers and often to judges as well. The Commission issued 
interpretations, or supported the staff’s interpretation in most cases.84 
Exemptions by the Commission were granted to applying parties, case by 
case. Rules were enacted only after many, sometimes hundreds, of 
exemptions were granted.85 In the years 1975 to 2000, these mechanisms 
allowed the Commission to test and re-test its exemptions (relief from the 
law) and its conditions (imposition of restrictions) and then generalize 
relief by rule. 
Today these mechanisms are not as easy to use for a number of 
reasons. That is not because there are rules in place. After all, in 1940, two 
acts were passed that were quite detailed, and many of the details do not fit 
today’s environment.86 The difference between the previous regulatory 
environment and today’s environment is in the Commission’s ability to 
create law by exempting advisers from the acts on a case-by-case basis. 
The exemptions and the rules in the 1975 to 2000 period deregulated 
and re-regulated. Much of the regulation in the 1975 to 2000 period was 
found in conditions to exemptive relief. The process reflected an 
exchange. Advisers received exemptions from constraints of the existing 
law in exchange for different legal limitations. It is not surprising that 
when the Commission tightened the internal controls within the advisers’ 
organizations, it had to amend the conditions that it imposed in a number 
of important exemptions, especially since it did not have direct statutory 
power to do so.87 It is not surprising that the advisers are challenging the 
amendments.88 After all, the practice in the past was to receive something 
(relief from current law) in return for restrictions. None were offered in the 
recent amendments to the conditions that imposed stricter requirements 
rather than relax them. The Commission’s explanations of the amended 
conditions emphasized the revelations of abuse and the need for stricter 
 84. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and 
Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial 
Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 58,400 (Oct. 16, 
1987).  
 85. See, e.g., Exemption for Open-End Management Investment Companies Issuing Multiple 
Classes of Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 20,915 (Feb. 23, 1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 11,876, 
11,876 (Mar. 2, 1995) (noting that “[s]ince 1985, the Commission has issued approximately 200 
exemptive orders allowing funds to issue multiple classes of shares in the same portfolio”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-6(c) (2000) (allowing SEC to issue exemptions from provisions of Investment Company Act).  
 86. See TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
34-35 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that Investment Company Act is “detailed” but “does not carve the 
industry in granite”).  
 87. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). 
 88. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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regulation.89 But it was a one-sided regulation with no de-regulation. This 
produces resistance, sometimes intense, to the regulation.  
Further, in the 1975 to 2000 period, when the advisers sought relief 
from legal constraints, they provided the Commission with information 
about their operations, costs, and objectives. The staff of the Commission 
could also request (and usually receive) additional information on these 
items. The information was reliable. It was offered by the most 
knowledgeable sources and was accompanied by a sanction on 
inaccuracies. Inaccurate information was likely to be refuted, either before 
the grant of exemption or thereafter (by competitors, for example). 
Providing the Commission with misleading information carried with it loss 
of credibility (a long-term sanction). Therefore, the probabilities were very 
high that the information would be true and robust (either initially or after 
staff questioning).  
In contrast, the information that accompanies investigations and 
prosecution is far more limited. Information that accompanies rules aimed 
at tightening regulation is not likely to be offered by advisers voluntarily, 
and comments on proposed rules could be sharply conflicting, depending 
on whether they are offered by the advisers or by representatives of the 
investors. Thus, in today’s environment the Commission initiates 
restrictive rules, and does not have the quality information that it has 
historically received from the industry. 
In addition, in 1975 to 2000, most of the requests for relief (combined 
with new regulatory conditions) came from the advisers. They sought 
permission for new activities or designs or transactions in which they 
desired to engage. The Commission’s initiative was usually limited to 
codifying no–action letters in a release,90 and codifying exemptions in a 
rule.91 In the new recent period, the initiative came from the Commission 
rather than from the advisers.92 And the regulation had to apply generally, 
by rules, at the outset.  
The Commission does, however, have today, as it did in the past, 
mechanisms to test various regulatory conditions, case by case. But these 
mechanisms are very different from the historical ones. Today, the 
mechanism the Commission uses to experiment derives from the cases it 
 89. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378, 46,378-80 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 90. See Appendix C. 
 91. See Appendix C. 
 92. See Appendix D. 
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brings against the violators of the law.93 And its information is derived 
from the facts and arguments produced in the judicial proceedings. It also 
gleans information during the negotiations for settlement with the accused. 
Ultimately, these settlements can shape informal rules. True, the 
Commission prosecuted violators in the past as well. However, the balance 
between exemptive regulation and prosecutorial regulation has changed. 
There is less exemptive conditional regulation and far more prosecutorial 
and settlement regulation.94 
This system of rule-making highlights the difference between 
regulation by exemptions and regulation by prosecution. Regulation by 
exemption aims at all the actors in the profession. Prosecution aims at the 
violators. Regulation by exemption is usually affected by, and sometimes 
is based on, a measure of consensus by the regulated. Prosecution is 
usually affected by the financial constraints on the prosecutors, public 
pressure, negotiated settlements, or judicial decisions. To the extent that 
judicial decisions and settlements are used as precedents or incorporated in 
rules, they could then apply to the larger family of advisers. Yet, rules that 
have their origins in reaction to profitable violations of the law are likely 
to have a different orientation from the historical rules that have their 
origins in requests for profitable permissible innovations. The rule-makers 
know the actions of the violators but not their impact on other members of 
the adviser community. They do not know whether these actions are likely 
to be isolated incidents or the drivers of a cascade. In addition, the 
decisions to prosecute and settle are not as well known as the exemptions 
and no-action letters. There is little publicity about the policies that lead to 
the decisions to prosecute and the guidelines to settle. There are few 
indications of the steps which the Commission should take to tighten the 
application of the law in order to eliminate a widespread abuse of trust, 
 93. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418 (Apr. 16, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004); 
Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2005)); 
Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 
(Aug. 2, 2004) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2005)). 
 94. A LEXIS search on Dec. 6, 2005 suggests that there may be less exemptive conditional 
regulation than in the past. A search of the SEC database including no-action letters and releases, 
excluding no-action letters, for terms often found in releases granting exemptive relief (i.e., (1) the 
word “order” and (2) the word “granting” preceding the word “exemption” by one word), retrieved 
385 documents for the period between Dec. 6, 2000 and Dec. 5, 2005 inclusive, and 651 documents 
for the period between Dec. 6, 1995 and Dec. 5, 2000 inclusive. 
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resurrect investors’ trust, and achieve this purpose at the lowest cost to 
honest advisers.95 
The Chamber of Commerce has unsuccessfully attacked the 
Commission’s authority to amend the conditions of exemptive rules (the 
regulatory side of the balance) without granting the industry any 
exemptions. Conservative academics attacked the decision as a violation 
of the “rule of law.” Yet, in the long-term the industry is likely to remain 
thankful to the D.C. Circuit for its decision. Without conditions, there 
would be no exemptions. Without exemptions, this dynamic and creative 
professional industry is likely to shrivel and die.  
Perhaps in this new era, the staff would start to issue no-action letters 
on proposed steps that the advisers are planning to take in order to 
implement the Commission’s directives. The staff might provide comfort 
to advisers who are unsure about the reach of prohibiting rules. Or the 
Commission could approve guidelines of not-for-profit organizations, such 
as the Independent Directors Forum, and indirectly to directors who want 
to perform their job well. The new era may require the Commission to 
review its regulations periodically. Among others, the reviews might focus 
on the regulations that are either violated more often or are subject to 
increasing requests for exemptions.  
The settlements that the Commission and the state enforcement 
agencies are reaching with accused organizations and persons can become 
a source of small “step-by-step” experiments. Contacts between the Office 
of Compliance at the Commission and the Chief Compliance Officers at 
the advisory organizations that focus on particular issues and events may 
be an effective preventive “common law” enforcement mechanism that 
can culminate in general guiding rules for the future. While the principles 
can be broadly announced, the details can be worked out case by case to 
be tested and to provide the substance of future rules and guides to 
implement them.  
Can corporate America benefit from a case-by-case system along the 
same lines of this model? In fact, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can offer a 
testing ground and a tentative answer. The Act has brought loud 
complaints by a number of large and small corporations. Since it applies to 
those who are guilty of fraud and those who are not, it is sometimes hard 
to justify a full imposition of the provisions of this Act. If the Securities 
 95. The Commission has also established an internal mechanism to uncover and highlight “red 
flags.” It uses statistical data and “watchdogs” within its Divisions. When such red flags appear, steps 
are taken to address the problems case by case. What is unknown is how the Commission reacts to 
these discoveries, and the kind of internal policies it establishes for the reaction.  
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and Exchange Commission were granted power to exempt from the Act 
under certain very broad guidelines, as it was granted under the 1940 Acts, 
then such system may develop. This is just an idea to be pursued in 
another writing. But I believe that it can potentially reduce the problems of 
general rules imposed on business that may prove too broad or too narrow. 
This current era poses great legal risk for fiduciaries. For them, the 
common law approach of trying and testing seems to be riskier than 
specifying rules. The trying and testing approach creates a gray area of 
uncertainty. And yet, most advisers could restrain their competitive drive, 
avoid the gray areas, and follow safe legal actions, especially if they knew 
that their competitors must self-impose similar limitations. The benefit of 
this common law approach is that it avoids costly and disruptive rules. 
Advisers could then give the Commission practical information to guide 
its regulatory actions. In the last analysis, the common law “legislative” 
approach may be the better way to go, not only for the regulators and the 
investors but for the advisers as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
U.S. Mutual Funds: Number of Funds, Total Net Assets (end of year) 
 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT 
BOOK 59, http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2005_factbook.pdf. 
 
Year 
 
Number of  
Funds 
Total Net Assets 
(billions of dollars)
1940 68 $0.45 
1945 73 1.28 
1950 98 2.53 
1955 125 7.84 
1960 161 17.03 
1965 170 35.22 
1970 361 47.62 
1971 392 55.05 
1972 410 59.83 
1973 421 46.52 
1974 431 35.78 
1975 426 45.87 
1976 452 51.28 
1977 477 48.94 
1978 505 55.84 
1979 526 94.51 
1980 564 134.76 
1981 665 241.37 
1982 857 296.68 
1983 1,026 292.99 
1984 1,243 370.68 
1985 1,528 495.39 
1986 1,835 715.67 
1987 2,312 769.17 
1988 2,737 809.37 
1989 2,935 980.67 
1990 3,079 1,065.19 
1991 3,403 1,393.19 
1992 3,824 1,642.54 
1993 4,534 2,069.96 
1994 5,325 2,155.32 
1995 5,725 2,811.29 
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Year 
 
Number of  
Funds 
Total Net Assets 
(billions of dollars)
1996 6,248 3,525.80 
1997 6,684 4,468.20 
1998 7,314 5,525.21 
1999 7,791 6,846.34 
2000 8,155 6,964.67 
2001 8,305 6,974.95 
2002 8,244 6,390.36 
2003 8,126 7,414.40 
2004 8,044 8,106.81 
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APPENDIX B 
1940–1974 
DEFINITIONAL: 13 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [Oct. 31, 1940] 
[definitional, for purposes of Rule N-2] 
 
§ 270.24b-1 Definitions. [June 21, 1941] [definition of terms used in 
Section 24(b) of 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.5b-1 Definition of “total assets.” [amended] [Nov. 22, 1941] 
[technical amendment to original version of Rule 5b-1]  
 
§ 270.8b-2 Definitions. [Dec. 19, 1953] [provides definitions for 
Regulation N-8B] 
 
§ 270.8b-2 Definitions. [amended] [May 14, 1954] [amended to 
accommodate revisions of forms] 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Oct. 20, 1954] 
[amended to conform to Pub. L. 83-577] 
 
§ 270.24b-1 Definitions. [amended] [Feb. 15, 1956] [amendment 
conforming to amendments to Form S-1, used in connection with 1933 
Act] 
 
§ 270.2a-4 Definition of “current net asset value” for use in computing 
periodically the current price of redeemable security. [Dec. 30, 1964] 
[defining “current net asset value” for purpose of “uniformity”]  
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Jan. 27, 1965] 
[amending definition of terms “rule” and “regulations” under 1940 Act to 
also include forms adopted pursuant to Act] 
 
§ 270.11a-1 Definition of exchange for purposes of section 11 of the Act. 
[July 21, 1967] 
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§ 270.3c-2 Definition of beneficial ownership in small business 
investment companies. [amended] [Aug. 13, 1968] [amended definition so 
as to exclude an additional situation from the definition of “investment 
company”] 
 
§ 270.2a-4 Definition of “current net asset value” for use in computing 
periodically the current price of redeemable security. [amended] [Jan. 8, 
1970] [amended definition] 
 
§ 270.3c-3 Definition of certain terms used in section 3(c)(1) of the Act 
with respect to certain debt securities offered by small business investment 
companies. [Apr. 18, 1972] [defining “public offering” permissively to 
exclude certain debt securities offered by small business investment 
companies] 
 
FORMS AND FILING: 35 
 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [Oct. 31, 
1940] [setting specifications for papers and applications to be filed] 
 
§ 270.30b2-1 Filing of reports to stockholders. [Jan. 4, 1941] [requiring 
filing of copies of reports to stockholders to meet certain conditions] 
 
§ 270.24b-2 Filing copies of sales literature. [June 21, 1941] [requiring 
that materials filed for compliance with section 24(b) make appropriate 
reference to the section] 
 
§ 270.0-3 Amendments to registration statements and reports. [Aug. 8, 
1941] [setting out formal standards for amendments to registration 
statements and reports] 
 
§ 270.0-4 Incorporation by reference. [Jan. 8, 1944] [authorizes 
incorporation by reference in registration statements and reports of 
documents and financial statements in other statements or reports filed 
pursuant to securities acts] 
 
§ 270.0-4 Incorporation by reference. [redesignated] [May 26, 1949] 
[redesignation] 
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§ 270.8b-4 Interpretation of requirements. [Dec. 18, 1953] [general 
interpretation of requirements for “preparation and filing of registration 
statements and reports pursuant to sections 8 and 30(a) of the Act.”] 
 
§ 270.8b-1 Scope of §§ 270.8b-1 to 270.8b-32. [Dec. 19, 1953] [states 
scope of Regulation N-8B; i.e., that it applies to registration statements 
and reports pursuant to sections 8 and 30(a) of the Act.] 
 
§ 270.8b-3 Title of securities.[Dec. 19, 1953] [specifies what information 
must be given if “title of securities” is required to be given] 
 
§ 270.8b-10 Requirements as to proper form. [Dec. 19, 1953] [requires 
that statement or report must be made on proper form] 
 
§ 270.8b-13 Preparation of registration statement or report. [Dec. 19, 
1953] [requiring some information from form to be included on statement 
or report and some to be omitted] 
 
§ 270.8b-14 Riders; inserts. [Dec. 19, 1953] [prohibiting use of riders; 
governing use of inserts] 
 
§ 270.8b-15 Amendments. [Dec. 19, 1953] [governing presentation of 
amendments] 
 
§ 270.8b-20 Additional information. [Dec. 19, 1953] [requiring additional 
information so that statements will not be misleading] 
 
§ 270.8b-21 Information unknown or not available. [Dec. 19, 1953] 
[allowing information not known or reasonably available to be omitted, 
but requiring an appropriate statement regarding such information] 
 
§ 270.8b-22 Disclaimer of control. [Dec. 19, 1953] [allowing a disclaimer 
of control if open to reasonable doubt, but requiring disclosure of pertinent 
material facts] 
 
§ 270.8b-23 Incorporation by reference. [Dec. 19, 1953] [allowing 
incorporation of material to be incorporated by reference, subject to 
conditions] 
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§ 270.8b-24 Summaries or outlines of documents. [Dec. 19, 1953] [stating 
that where a summary or outline is required, “only a brief statement shall 
be made,” and incorporation by reference is allowed] 
 
§ 270.8b-25 Extension of Time for Furnishing Information. [Dec. 19, 
1953] [if information is not available at required time, allowing a separate 
document to be filed, including a separate request for an extension of time]  
 
§ 270.8b-30 Additional exhibits. [Dec. 19, 1953] [allowing the filing of 
exhibits not required] 
 
§ 270.8b-31 Omission of substantially identical documents. [Dec. 19, 
1953] [allowing a copy of only one of substantially identical documents to 
be filed, with appropriate disclosure regarding documents not filed] 
 
§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of exhibits by reference. [Dec. 19, 1953] 
[allowing incorporation by reference as exhibit to another filed document, 
subject to appropriate disclosure] 
 
§ 270.8b-5 Time of filing original registration statement. [amended] [May 
14, 1954] [amended to accommodate revisions of forms] 
 
§ 270.8b-23 Incorporation by reference. [amended] [May 14, 1954] 
[amended to accommodate revisions of forms] 
 
§ 270.17d-2 Form for report by small business investment company and 
affiliated bank. [Nov. 29, 1961] [prescribing form for reports required by 
amendment to Rule 17d-1] 
 
§ 270.0-4 Incorporation by reference. [amended] [Feb. 13, 1964] 
[conforms Rule to Rule 24 of Revised Rules of Practice; no substantive 
change] 
 
§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of exhibits by reference. [Feb. 13, 1964] 
[amended] 
 
§ 270.0-3 Amendments to registration statements and reports. [amended] 
[Feb. 21, 1968] [defines term “exchange”; clarifies that certain 
transactions are subject to section 11(a) of 1940 Act “so as to preclude the 
imposition of a new sales load”] 
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§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[June 27, 1968] [amendments restrictive; (1) requiring certain filings in 
“quintuplicate” rather than “triplicate”; (2) prohibits statement that 
applicant offers application in evidence at any hearing; this change was to 
conform to current hearing procedures and consent is “generally of no 
significance”; (3) requires name and address of applicant and contact 
person] 
 
§ 270.27e-1 Requirements for notice to be mailed to certain purchasers of 
periodic payment plan certificates sold subject to section 27(d) of the Act. 
[amended] [Aug. 11, 1971] [minor changes in forms which are part of 
Rule; at request of Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors; “to 
facilitate the use of the forms” in some circumstances and “to account for” 
the occurrence of certain circumstances] 
 
§ 270.0-8 Payment of fees. [Jan. 29, 1972] [to accommodate amendment 
to Rule 0-5 under 1940 Act, requiring application fee where not required 
before, and new Rule 8b-6, requiring fee for registration not required 
before; Rule 0-8 specifies form in which fees must be paid] 
 
§ 270.8b-6 [Reserved] [Jan. 29, 1972] [requiring fee for registration] 
 
§ 270.20a-1 Solicitation of proxies, consents and authorizations. 
[amended] [Jan. 29, 1972] [allowing payment of fee at time of filing 
preliminary solicitation material in lieu of “fees specified in Rule 14a-6 
. . . under the [1934 Act]”] 
 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[Aug. 29, 1973] [requiring submission of proposed notices for possible use 
by SEC in giving public notice] 
 
§ 270.0-5 Procedure with respect to applications and other matters. 
[amended] [Aug. 29, 1973] [correction; changing phrase “a date to be 
specified in the notice” because notices contain no exact date] 
 
BOOKS AND RECORDS: 4 
 
§ 270.31a-1 Records to be maintained by registered investment 
companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons 
having transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] 
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[Dec. 5, 1962] [adds “specificity and detail” to former Rule governing 
records to be maintained] 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Dec. 5, 
1962] [adds “specificity and detail” to former Rule governing records to 
be preserved] 
 
§ 270.31a-3 Records prepared or maintained by other than person required 
to maintain and preserve them. [Dec. 5, 1962] [requires written agreement 
from another party if records are held by another party] 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Mar. 26, 
1973] [permitting maintenance and preservation of records on microfilm; 
prior version permitted such use three years after creation of hard copy] 
 
CUSTODY: 3 
 
§ 270.17f-1 Custody of securities with members of national securities 
exchanges. [Oct. 31, 1940] [requirements for firms acting as custodian] 
 
§ 270.17f-2 Custody of investments by registered management investment 
company. [amended] [Oct. 11, 1947] [“clarification” of Rule stating that in 
some circumstances securities are deemed to be in custody of investment 
company; since Rule sets conditions under which investment company 
may maintain securities in own custody, appears to be a restrictive 
amendment as a broader definition of when securities are in investment 
company’s custody would result in restrictions of rule being more likely to 
apply] 
 
§ 270.17f-3 Free cash accounts for investment companies with bank 
custodians. [May 18, 1972] [“except[ing] petty cash accounts from bank 
custodianship [for purposes of section 17(f) of the 1940 Act] in situations 
where a registered investment company employs a bank custodian”] 
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SUBSTANTIVE EXEMPTIONS AND REGULATION: 58 
 
§ 270.6d-1 Exemption for certain closed-end investment companies. [Nov. 
2, 1940] [implementation of exemption for certain closed-end companies 
under section 6(d) of 1940 Act; setting requirements for application] 
 
§ 270.30e-2 Reports to shareholders of unit investment trusts. [originally 
§ 270.30d-2 before redesignation] [Jan. 4, 1941] [requiring reports to 
shareholders of unit investment trusts] 
 
§ 270.19a-1 Written statement to accompany dividend payments by 
management companies. [Feb. 25, 1941] [requirements for written 
statement required by section 19 for management companies] 
 
§ 270.10f-1 Conditional exemption of certain underwriting transactions. 
[Feb. 28, 1941] [exemption from section 10(f) of certain persons during 
existence of underwriting under some circumstances] 
 
§ 270.17a-1 Exemption of certain underwriting transactions exempted by 
§ 270.10f-1. [Feb. 28, 1941] [exemption from section 17(a)(1) of certain 
persons during existence of underwriting under some circumstances] 
 
§ 270.13a-1 Exemption for change of status by temporarily diversified 
company. [Aug. 8, 1941] [exemption from section 13(a)(1) for change of 
subclassification from diversified to non-diversified company under 
certain circumstances] 
 
§ 270.6b-1 Exemption of employees’ securities company pending 
determination of application. [Dec. 2, 1941] [providing temporary 
exemption from Act for employees’ securities company which files 
application for exemption under section 6(c) of Act pending final 
determination of application]  
 
§ 270.32a-1 Exemption of certain companies from affiliation provisions of 
section 32(a). [Dec. 23, 1941] [conditional exemption of narrow class of 
companies from requirement in section 32(a) of Act that independent 
public accountants be selected by disinterested directors]  
 
§ 270.45a-1 Confidential treatment of names and addresses of dealers of 
registered investment company securities. [amended] [Jan. 10, 1942] 
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[amended in connection with adoption of Form N-8B-2 for unit 
investment trusts]  
 
§ 270.23c-2 Call and redemption of securities issued by registered closed-
end companies. [Aug. 25, 1942] [allows closed-end companies to call or 
redeem its securities pursuant to the terms of the securities or other 
agreement, notwithstanding Rule N-23C1-1, provided that conditions are 
met]  
 
§ 270.23c-1 Repurchase of securities by closed-end companies. [amended] 
[Dec. 15, 1942] [broadens scope of former Rule, permits repurchases in 
other situations] 
 
§ 270.2a-1 Valuation of portfolio securities in special cases. [amended] 
[Mar. 24, 1943] [conforms former Rule to Internal Revenue Code] 
 
§ 270.10f-2 Exercise of warrants or rights received on portfolio securities. 
[Jan. 8, 1944] [exempts from section 10(f) of Act purchase of securities 
pursuant to exercises of warrants or rights provided that conditions are 
met] 
 
§ 270.15a-1 Exemption from stockholders’ approval of certain small 
investment advisory contracts. [Jan. 8, 1944] [exempting investment 
adviser of registered investment company from sections 15(a) and 15(e) 
requirement if certain conditions are met] 
 
§ 270.5b-2 Exclusion of certain guarantees as securities of the guarantor. 
[Jan. 16, 1945] [provides that guarantee is not considered a security of 
grantor for purposes of section 5 provided that conditions are met; 
“alleviates . . . difficulties” in meeting diversification standards] 
 
§ 270.28b-1 Investment in loans partially or wholly guaranteed under the 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended. [June 13, 1946] 
[authorizes Servicemen’s Readjustment Act loans as qualified investments 
for face-amount securities companies] 
 
§ 270.17a-3 Exemption of transactions with fully owned subsidiaries. 
[May 28, 1947] [exempts transactions with fully-owned subsidiaries from 
section 17(a) of Act] 
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§ 270.17a-2 Exemption of certain purchase, sale, or borrowing 
transactions. [amended] [July 29, 1947] [amended prior Rule so that 
exemption from section 17(a) of Act will apply to certain transactions 
between banks]  
 
§ 270.17a-4 Exemption of transactions pursuant to certain contracts. [July 
29, 1947] [exempts transactions pursuant to certain contracts from section 
17(a) of Act] 
 
§ 270.7d-1 Specification of conditions and arrangements for Canadian 
management investment companies requesting order permitting 
registration. [May 5, 1954] [stating “conditions and arrangements to be 
entered into by a management investment company organized under the 
laws of Canada” to facilitate “an order permitting registration of the 
company under section 7(d) of the Act”]  
 
§ 270.24e-1 Filing of certain prospectuses as post-effective amendments to 
registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933. [Apr. 28, 1955] 
[clarifying language in Pub. L. No. 83-577; a more lenient interpretation 
that would not “require the filing of every changed prospectus as a post-
effective amendment”] 
 
§ 270.45a-1 Confidential treatment of names and addresses of dealers of 
registered investment company securities. [amended] [Sept. 20, 1955] 
[amended to be consistent with Executive Order 10501; “to minimize any 
confusion between the use of the word ‘confidential’ in national defense 
classifications and its use elsewhere”] 
 
§ 270.17a-5 Pro rata distribution neither “sale” nor “purchase.” [Oct. 6, 
1955] [excluding pro rata distributions from prohibition in section 17(a)] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Jan. 23, 1957] [amends previous 
Rule so as to not require a filing for bonus or pension plans without profit-
sharing characteristics, but also amends Rule to require filing for “joint 
enterprises or arrangements,” which may be broader]  
 
§ 270.20a-1 Solicitation of proxies, consents and authorizations. 
[amended] [Mar. 3, 1960] [requiring information to be furnished when 
solicitation is made or on behalf of management of investment company] 
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§ 270.14a-1 Use of notification pursuant to Regulation E under the 
Securities Act of 1933. [Apr. 22, 1960] [allowing a small business 
investment company to comply with section 14(a) of 1940 Act by filing 
notification pursuant to Regulation E under 1933 Act] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Nov. 29, 1961] [exempting certain 
transactions involving banks and an affiliated SBIC from requirements of 
rule] 
 
§ 270.18c-1 Exemption of privately held indebtedness. [Nov. 29, 1961] 
[exempting privately held indebtedness by small business investment 
company from section 18(c) of 1940 Act if conditions are met] security.] 
 
§ 270.17a-6 Exemption for transactions with portfolio affiliates. 
[amended] [May 9, 1964] [expanded prior exemptive rule to provide 
additional exemptions] 
 
§ 270.15a-3 Exemption for initial period of investment adviser of certain 
registered separate accounts from requirement of security holder approval 
of investment advisory contract. [Aug. 5, 1969] [exemption from section 
15(a) of 1940 Act under certain conditions] 
 
§ 270.16a-1 Exemption for initial period of directors of certain registered 
accounts from requirements of election by security holders. [Aug. 5, 1969] 
[exemption from section 16(a) of 1940 Act under certain conditions] 
 
§ 270.22e-1 Exemption from section 22(e) of the Act during annuity 
payment period of variable annuity contracts participating in certain 
registered separate accounts. [Aug. 5, 1969] [exemption from section 22(e) 
of 1940 Act under certain conditions] 
 
§ 270.32a-2 Exemption for initial period from vote of security holders on 
independent public accountant for certain registered separate accounts. 
[Aug. 5, 1969] [exemption from section 32(a)(2) of 1940 Act under certain 
conditions] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Aug. 18, 1970] [amended Rule to 
conform to simultaneous amendment to Regulation S-X; amendment to 
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Regulation S-X requires companies to make provision for taxes on 
undistributed capital gains] 
 
§ 270.27a-1 Conditions for compliance with and exemptions from certain 
provisions of section 27(a)(1) and section 27(h)(1) of the Act for certain 
registered separate accounts. [amended] [June 17, 1971] [conforms rule to 
section 27(h) of 1940 Act adopted as part of 1970 Act] 
 
§ 270.27a-2 Exemption from section 27(a)(3) and section 27(h)(3) of the 
Act for certain registered separate accounts. [amended] [June 17, 1971] 
[conforms rule to section 27(h) of 1940 Act adopted as part of 1970 Act]  
 
§ 270.27a-3 Exemption from section 27(a)(4) and section 27(h)(5) of the 
Act for certain registered separate accounts. [amended] [June 17, 1971] 
[conforms rule to section 27(h) of 1940 Act adopted as part of 1970 Act] 
 
§ 270.27c-1 Exemption from section 27(c)(1) and section 27(d) of the Act 
during annuity payment period of variable annuity contracts participating 
in certain registered separate accounts. [amended] [June 17, 1971] 
[conforms rule to section 27(h) of 1940 Act adopted as part of 1970 Act] 
 
§ 270.18f-1 Exemption from certain requirements of section 18(f)(1) (of 
the Act) for registered open-end investment companies which have the 
right to redeem in kind. [June 23, 1971] [exemption from section 18(f)(1) 
of 1940 Act; noting that some states and countries require (or are 
considering requiring) that open-end companies require, as a condition of 
doing business, redemption priorities for residents of their jurisdiction, and 
that such priorities would otherwise violate Section 18]  
 
§ 270.27d-1 Reserve requirements for principal underwriters and 
depositors to carry out the obligations to refund charges required by 
section 27(d) and section 27(f) of the Act. [July 15, 1971] [requires 
principal underwriters/depositors to deposit/maintain funds in segregated 
trust account to carry out these obligations] 
 
§ 270.27d-2 Insurance company undertaking in lieu of segregated trust 
account. [July 15, 1971] [“permits an insurance company obligation as an 
optional alternative to the segregated trust account”]  
 
§ 270.27e-1 Requirements for notice to be mailed to certain purchasers of 
periodic payment plan certificates sold subject to section 27(d) of the Act. 
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[July 15, 1971] [“specifies the method, form and contents of” the notice 
required by section 27(e) of the 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.27g-1 Election to be governed by section 27(h). [July 15, 1971] 
[provides that an election made under section 27(h) of the 1940 Act is to 
be made in as a Notice of Election filed with the 1933 Act registration 
statement]  
 
§ 270.27h-1 Exemptions from section 27(h)(4) for certain payments. [July 
15, 1971] [exempts certain payments from section 27(h)(4) of the 1940 
Act] 
 
§ 270.19a-1 Written statement to accompany dividend payments by 
management companies. [redesignated] [Dec. 2, 1971] 
 
§ 270.19b-1 Frequency of distribution of capital gains. [Dec. 2, 1971] 
[limiting frequency of distribution of capital gains by registered 
companies] 
 
§ 270.27a-3 Exemption from section 27(a)(4) and section 27(h)(5) of the 
Act for certain registered separate accounts. [amended] [Dec. 11, 1971] 
[correction of typographical error] 
 
§ 270.27f-1 Notice of right of withdrawal required to be mailed to periodic 
payment plan certificate holders and exemption from section 27(f) for 
certain periodic payment plan certificates. [Dec. 18, 1971] [deleted 
paragraphs made “superfluous” by Pub. L. No. 92-165] 
 
§ 270.18c-2 Exemptions of certain debentures issued by small business 
investment companies. [Apr. 18, 1972] [exempts certain debentures issued 
by small business investment companies from section 18(c) of the 1940 
Act]  
 
§ 270.27e-1 Requirements for notice to be mailed to certain purchasers of 
periodic payment plan certificates sold subject to section 27(d) of the Act. 
[amended] [May 18, 1972] [amendments requested by Association of 
Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors; modified introductory sentence referencing 
SEC to avoid implication that notice must be sent because “the [SEC] has 
taken action against the sponsor”] 
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§ 270.27f-1 Notice of right of withdrawal required to be mailed to periodic 
payment plan certificate holders and exemption from section 27(f) for 
certain periodic payment plan certificates. [amended] [May 18, 1972] 
[amendments requested by Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors; 
modified introductory sentence referencing SEC to avoid implication that 
notice must be sent because “the [SEC] has taken action against the 
sponsor” and use of number of payments rather than years for periodic 
plans to avoid the impression that a plan purchaser must complete his 
payments at a particular time] 
 
§ 270.18f-2 Fair and equitable treatment for holders of each class or series 
of stock of series investment companies. [Aug. 26, 1972] [implementation 
of section 18(f)(2) of 1940 Act; requiring that matters to be submitted to 
all shareholders must be approved by a majority of shareholders of each 
class or series] 
 
§ 270.2a-1 Valuation of portfolio securities in special cases. [amended] 
[Apr. 4, 1973] [technical amendment to conform to 1970 amendments] 
 
§ 270.2a-2 Effect of eliminations upon valuation of portfolio securities. 
[amended] [Apr. 4, 1973] [technical amendment to conform Rule to 1970 
amendments]  
 
§ 270.7d-1 Specification of conditions and arrangements for Canadian 
management investment companies requesting order permitting registration. 
[amended] [Apr. 4, 1973] [technical amendment to conform Rule to 1970 
amendments]  
 
§ 270.19a-1 Written statement to accompany dividend payments by 
management companies. [amended] [Apr. 4, 1973] [technical amendment 
to conform Rule to 1970 amendments]  
 
§ 270.17g-1 Bonding of officers and employees of registered management 
investment companies. [amended] [Mar. 21, 1974] [(1) requires minimum 
coverage; (2) allows company to be named as insured under some 
circumstances; (3) exempts joint insured bonding arrangements under the 
Rule from section 17(d) of the 1940 Act and its Rules; (4) requires 
minimum factors to be considered by directors in approving bond; (5) 
provides notification and filing requirements to provide jointly insured 
companies the protections available for solely insured companies] 
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§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Oct. 25, 1974] [expanding 
subsection (d), which enumerates situations where no filing is required 
under the rule, to additional circumstances]  
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APPENDIX C 
 
1975–2000 
 
[Former section § 270.30d-1 was redesignated as § 270.30e-1 on Jan. 16, 
2001. It is referred to below only as § 270.30e-1; i.e., its enactment and 
amendments as § 270.30d-1 are not listed separately. Similarly, former 
section § 270.30f-1, redesignated as § 270.30h-1, is referred to only as 
§ 270.30h-1, and former section § 270.30d-2, redesignated as § 270.30e-2, 
is referred to only as § 270.30e-2.] 
 
DEFINITIONAL: 15 
§ 270.3c-4 Definition of common trust fund as used in section 3(c)(3) of 
the Act. [Jan 17, 1978] [defining term to include multi-bank common trust 
funds, in effect exempting them from the 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.0-10 Small entities under the Investment Company Act for purposes 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. [Feb. 4, 1982] [defining “small 
business” or “small organization” for purposes of 1940 Act, for purposes 
of rulemaking in accordance with Administrative Procedure Act]  
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [Aug. 9, 1983] [defining 
“variable annuity contract” in conjunction with Rule 6c-8, below] 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [Aug. 9, 1983] [technical 
amendment defining “separate account” and conforming Rule to Rule 11a-
2, below] 
 
§ 270.10b-1 Definition of regular broker or dealer. [Oct. 17, 1984] 
[providing objective definition of term for purposes of section 10(b) and 
Form N-1R; that subsection restricted use of directors or officers as 
regular broker or dealer] 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Oct. 22, 1985] 
[technical amendments related to amendment to Rule 22c-1] 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] 
[defines “EDGAR” and related terms; accommodates related release 
which requires electronic filing] 
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§ 270.8b-2 Definitions. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] [refers to sources that 
define “EDGAR” and related terms; accommodates related release which 
requires electronic filing] 
 
§ 270.2a51-1. Definition of investments for purposes of section 2(a)(51) 
(definition of “qualified purchaser”); certain calculations. [Apr. 9, 1997] 
[“implement[ed] certain provisions of the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new exclusion for certain 
privately offered companies; defines term for that purpose] 
 
§ 270.2a51-2. Definitions of beneficial owner for certain purposes under 
sections 2(a)(51) and 3(c)(7) and determining indirect ownership interests. 
[Apr. 9, 1997] [“implement[ed] certain provisions of the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new exclusion 
for certain privately offered companies; defines term for that purpose] 
 
§ 270.2a51-3. Certain companies as qualified purchasers. [Apr. 9, 1997] 
[“implement[ed] certain provisions of the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new exclusion for certain 
privately offered companies; partially defines term for that purpose] 
 
§ 270.3c-1. Definition of beneficial ownership for certain section 3(c)(1) 
funds. [Apr. 9, 1997] [“implement[ed] certain provisions of the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new exclusion 
for certain privately offered companies; defines term for that purpose] 
 
§ 270.3c-5. Beneficial ownership by knowledgeable employees and certain 
other persons. [Apr. 9, 1997] [“implement[ed] certain provisions of the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new 
exclusion for certain privately offered companies; defines related terms for 
that purpose] 
 
§ 270.3c-6. Certain transfers of interests in section 3(c)(1) and section 
3(c)(7) funds. [Apr. 9, 1997] [“implement[ed] certain provisions of the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,” specifically new 
exclusion for certain privately offered companies; defines related terms 
and partially defines “beneficial ownership” for that purpose] 
 
§ 270.0-10. Small entities under the Investment Company Act for 
purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. [amended] [June 30, 1998] 
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[makes definition of “small business” more restrictive for investment 
companies] 
 
FORMS AND FILING: 40 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[Jan. 23, 1979] [requiring that documents be sequentially paginated, to 
conform to SEC’s “Micrographic Conversion Program”] 
 
§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of certain 
investment company securities. [amended] [Apr. 3, 1979] [sets a minimum 
number of copies of notice to be filed, based on SEC’s experience that 
insufficient numbers of copies were being filed] 
 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[Dec. 30, 1982] [elimination of legal size paper from filings; to 
accommodate SEC’s “micrographics filing program”] 
 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[Apr. 21, 1983] [technical amendment “to provide that, when the last day 
for timely filing of papers required to be filed by the Act falls on a 
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the time within which required papers may 
be filed with the Commission will be extended until the following business 
day”] 
 
§ 270.0-8 Payment of fees. [amended] [July 3, 1984] [change to 
accommodate amendment allowing fees to be sent to lockbox] 
 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [Aug. 10, 1984] 
[redesignating former Rule 8b-11A; technical amendment to conform Rule 
to new Form N-1A] 
 
§ 270.8b-12 Requirements as to paper, printing and language. [Aug. 10, 
1984] [redesignating former Rule 8b-12A; technical amendment to 
conform Rule to new Form N-1A] 
 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [amended] [June 25, 
1985] [“amended to add Forms N-3 and N-4 to the registration forms 
specified”] [50 Fed. Reg. 26,146 (1985); purpose of new forms is “to 
integrate and codify disclosure requirements for insurance company 
separate accounts that offer variable annuity contracts and to shorten and 
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simplify the prospectus provided to investors, while making more 
extensive information available for those who request it”]  
 
§ 270.8b-12 Requirements as to paper, printing and language. [amended] 
[June 25, 1985] [“amended to add Forms N-3 and N-4 to the registration 
forms specified”; purpose of new forms is “to integrate and codify 
disclosure requirements for insurance company separate accounts that 
offer variable annuity contracts and to shorten and simplify the prospectus 
provided to investors, while making more extensive information available 
for those who request it”]  
 
§ 270.20a-1 Solicitation of proxies, consents and authorizations. 
[amended] [Dec. 29, 1987] [requiring that “where preliminary material is 
not required to be filed, a filing fee [must] be paid when definitive material 
is filed”; to accommodate amendments that provide that certain 
preliminary material need not be filed]  
 
§ 270.24b-3 Sales literature deemed filed. [Feb. 10, 1988] [“relieve[s] 
investment companies of their obligation to file sales material with the 
[SEC] if it is filed with the [NASD]”] 
 
§ 270.8b-16 Amendments to registration statement. [amendment] [Mar. 
13, 1989] [“to correct erroneous references”] 
 
§ 270.17f-1 Custody of securities with members of national securities 
exchanges. [amended] [Aug. 4, 1989] [accommodate new form; new form 
requires form to be attached as cover sheet to examination certificates] 
 
§ 270.17f-2 Custody of investments by registered management investment 
company. [amended] [Aug. 4, 1989] [accommodate new form; new form 
requires form to be attached as cover sheet to examination certificates] 
 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [amended] [Dec. 1, 
1992] [accommodates amendments to Form N-2, which make a “short, 
simplified prospectus” available to closed-end companies] 
 
§ 270.8b-12 Requirements as to paper, printing and language. [amended] 
[Dec. 1, 1992] [accommodates amendments to Form N-2, which make a 
“short, simplified prospectus” available to closed-end companies] 
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§ 270.8b-16 Amendments to registration statement. [amended] [Dec. 1, 
1992] [amendment to Rule to exempt closed-end funds from its 
requirement if conditions are met] 
 
§ 270.0-2 General requirements of papers and applications. [amended] 
[Mar. 18, 1993] [accommodates related release which requires electronic 
filing; clarifies that some filings must still be made in paper form unless 
otherwise required] 
 
§ 270.0-4 Incorporation by reference. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] 
[accommodates related release which requires electronic filing; clarifies 
that incorporation by reference is not allowed if referenced document is in 
paper form, filer is electronic filer under temporary hardship exemption, 
and electronic copy is not submitted] 
 
§ 270.8b-15 Amendments. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] [accommodates 
new “rule 102(b) of Regulation S-T (§ 232.102(b))” which requires 
electronic filing]  
 
§ 270.8b-23 Incorporation by reference. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] 
[accommodates related release which requires electronic filing] 
 
§ 270.8b-25 Extension of Time for Furnishing Information. [amended] 
[Mar. 18, 1993] [accommodates related release which requires electronic 
filing] 
 
§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of exhibits by reference. [amended] [Mar. 18, 
1993] [accommodates related release which requires electronic filing] 
 
§ 270.24b-2 Filing copies of sales literature. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] 
[accommodates related release which requires electronic filing; clarifies 
that this material must be submitted on paper even by electronic filer] 
 
§ 270.45a-1 Confidential treatment of names and addresses of dealers of 
registered investment company securities. [amended] [Mar. 18, 1993] 
[accommodates related release which requires electronic filing; clarifies 
that this material must be submitted on paper even by electronic filer] 
 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [amended] [May 17, 
1995] [permitting “[d]uplicated or facsimile versions of manual 
signatures” on statements or reports if conditions are met]  
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§ 270.0-4 Incorporation by Reference. [amended] [June 23, 1995] 
[accommodated technical change, i.e., move of former Rule 24 of Rules of 
Practice to Parts 228-229] 
 
§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of Exhibits by Reference. [amended] [June 23, 
1995] [accommodated technical change, i.e., move of former Rule 24 of 
Rules of Practice to Parts 228-229] 
 
§ 270.8b-12 Requirements as to paper, printing and language. [amended] 
[May 15, 1996] [adaptation of legibility requirements to electronic media]  
 
§ 270.0-5 Procedure with respect to applications and other matters. 
[amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [elimination of fees; one rationale was 
“eliminating unnecessary regulations imposed on the capital formation 
process”; the other rationale was that fees represented little of the SEC’s 
fee revenue; therefore, recordkeeping for these fees was costly; Rule 8b-6 
was removed at the same time] 
 
§ 270.0-8 Payment of fees. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [accommodation to 
elimination of fee, above]  
 
§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of certain 
investment company securities. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [elimination of 
fees, above] 
 
§ 270.30a-1 Annual report. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [elimination of 
fees, above] 
 
§ 270.30b1-1 Semi-annual report. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [elimination 
of fees, above] 
 
§ 270.30b1-3 Transition reports. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1996] [elimination 
of fees, above] 
 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [amended] [Mar. 23, 
1998] [“to modify signature requirements to provide more flexibility for 
issuers filing on paper”] 
 
§ 270.8b-23 Incorporation by Reference. [amended] [May 21, 1999] 
[removal of cross-reference no longer necessary because of end of 
EDGAR phase-in period] 
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§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of exhibits by reference. [amended] [May 21, 
1999] [removal of cross-reference no longer necessary because of end of 
EDGAR phase-in period] 
 
§ 270.8b-2 Definitions. [amended] [Apr. 27, 2000] [conform to removal of 
requirement to submit Financial Data Schedules] 
 
§ 270.8b-32 Incorporation of exhibits by reference. [amended] [Apr. 27, 
2000] [conform to removal of requirement to submit Financial Data 
Schedules] 
 
BOOKS AND RECORDS: 4 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Nov. 24, 
1986] [allows storage of records on computer storage media] 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Feb. 10, 
1988] [“to clarify that investment companies must maintain sales material 
for inspection by the [SEC]”] 
 
§ 270.31a-1 Records to be maintained by registered investment 
companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons 
having transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] 
[Mar. 28, 1996] [accommodation of amendments to Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.31a-1 Records to be maintained by registered investment 
companies, certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons 
having transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] 
[Dec. 9, 1997] [conforming amendment to amendments to Rule 2a-7]  
 
CUSTODY: 12 
§ 270.17f-4 Custody of investment company assets with a securities 
depository. [Nov. 1, 1978] [allowing book-entry system as permitted 
securities depository, but also setting conditions for deposit in depository 
systems] 
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§ 270.17f-4 Deposits of securities in securities depositories. [amended] 
[Sept. 14, 1984] [conforming amendment to reflect adoption of Rule 17f-
5, below] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [Sept. 14, 1984] [“provides an exemption from the custody 
requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940”] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [Sept. 17, 1985] [clarified exemptive rule; the two 
modifications are less restrictive in nature] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [Dec. 19, 1985] [correction of inadvertent error in 
earlier amendment] 
 
§ 270.17f-4 Deposits of securities in securities depositories. [amended] 
[Sept. 24, 1993] [“The amended rules no longer require directors to review 
certain procedures and arrangements annually, and require instead that 
directors make and approve changes only when necessary. The 
amendments are intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment 
company boards by substituting more meaningful requirements for an 
annual review requirement, which is not necessary to protect investors.”] 
 
§ 270.17f-6 Custody of investment company assets with Futures 
Commission Merchants and Commodity Clearing Organizations. [Dec. 17, 
1996] [“permit[s] registered investment companies to maintain their assets 
with futures commission merchants and certain other entities in connection 
with futures contracts and commodity options traded on U.S. and foreign 
exchanges”] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [May 16, 1997] [“provide[s] investment companies with 
greater flexibility in managing their foreign custody arrangements 
consistent with the safekeeping of investment company assets”; “also 
expand[s] the class of foreign banks and securities depositories that may 
serve as investment company custodians”] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [May 6, 1999] [extension of compliance date] 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/3
p 939 Frankel book pages.doc4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] JURISPRUDENCE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 987 
 
 
 
 
§ 270.17f-4 Deposits of securities in securities depositories. [amended] 
[May 3, 2000] [conforming amendments to Rule 17f-7 and amendments to 
17f-5] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [May 3, 2000] [“excludes arrangements with foreign 
securities depositories from its scope because they are addressed by rule 
17f-7”; “also reflects other clarifying changes from the previous version of 
the rule”; including a clarification of some circumstances governed by 
Rule 17f-5 and some governed by Rule 17f-7] 
  
§ 270.17f-7 Custody of investment company assets with a foreign 
securities depository. [May 3, 2000] [“permits a fund to maintain assets 
with a foreign securities depository if certain conditions are met”] 
 
SUBSTANTIVE EXEMPTIONS AND REGULATION: 132 
§ 270.22d-2 Sales of redeemable securities without a sales load following 
redemption. [Aug. 13, 1975] [“allow[ing] sales of redeemable shares of a 
registered investment company at prices which reflect the elimination of 
sales load under certain enumerated circumstances”] 
 
§ 270.27d-1 Reserve requirements for principal underwriters and 
depositors to carry out the obligations to refund charges required by 
section 27(d) and section 27(f) of the Act. [amended] [Oct. 31, 1975] 
[“reduc[ing] the reserve requirements for front-end load periodic payment 
plan certificates subject to section 27(d) of the Act . . . by approximately 
50%”] 
 
§ 270.15a-2 Annual continuance of contracts. [Sept. 24, 1976] 
[interpreting “annually” for purposes of section 15(a)(2) of the 1940 Act to 
prohibit certain inappropriate practices] 
 
§ 270.6e-2 Exemptions for certain variable life insurance separate 
accounts. [Oct. 27, 1976] [“exempt[ing] separate accounts formed by life 
insurance companies to fund certain variable life insurance contracts from 
the registration requirements of the [1940] Act” if certain conditions are 
met] 
 
§ 270.6e-2 Exemptions for certain variable life insurance separate 
accounts. [amended] [Dec. 1, 1976]  
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§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of an indefinite 
number of certain investment company securities. [Nov. 9, 1977] 
[allowing “registration of an indefinite number of securities issued by a 
face-amount certificate company or redeemable securities issued by an 
open-end investment company or unit investment trust” provided that 
filing and notice requirements are met]  
 
§ 270.14a-3 Exemption from section 14(a) of the Act for certain registered 
unit investment trusts and their principal underwriters. [May 22, 1979] 
[granting certain unit investment trusts exemption from section 14(a) of 
1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.19b-1 Frequency of distribution of capital gains. [amended] [May 
22, 1979] [granting certain unit investment trusts exemption from Rule 
141-3(b) under 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [May 22, 1979] [granting certain unit investment trusts 
exemption from Rule 14a-3(b) under 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [June 20, 1979] 
[expands exemption to cover other transactions] 
 
§ 270.17e-1 Brokerage transactions on a securities exchange. [June 26, 
1979] [“provid[ing] that, for purposes of section 17(e)(2)(A) of the Act, a 
commission, fee or other remuneration shall be deemed as not exceeding 
the usual and customary broker’s commission, if certain conditions are 
satisfied”] 
 
§ 270.14a-3 Exemption from section 14(a) of the Act for certain registered 
unit investment trusts and their principal underwriters. [amended] [July 9, 
1979] [correction] 
 
§ 270.19b-1 Frequency of distribution of capital gains. [amended] [July 9, 
1979] [correction] 
 
§ 270.17a-6 Exemption for transactions with portfolio affiliates. 
[amended] [Aug. 20, 1979] [amended to permit additional transactions]  
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§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [Aug. 20, 1979] [“unlinks the pricing of 
investment company shares from the New York Stock Exchange”; 
proposing release noted that an “investment company’s portfolio securities 
might not be listed for trading on that exchange”]  
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Oct. 10, 1979] [exempting another 
type of transaction from prohibition in rule] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Oct. 12, 1979] [exempting another 
type of transaction from prohibition in rule] 
 
§ 270.2a-6 Certain transactions not deemed assignments. [Jan. 9, 1980] 
[“deems certain transactions not to involve the assignment of a contract for 
purposes of sections 15(a) and 15(b) of the [1940] Act . . . that do not 
result in a change of actual control or management of the investment 
adviser or the principal underwriter, respectively”] 
 
§ 270.15a-4 Temporary exemption for certain investment advisers. [Jan. 9, 
1980] [“provides a temporary exemption, not to exceed 120 days, from the 
requirement of the Act that an investment advisory contract with an 
investment company must be approved by the investment company’s 
shareholders”] 
 
§ 270.17a-8 Mergers of affiliated companies. [Feb. 26, 1980] [“permits 
certain affiliated investment companies to merge or consolidate”] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Feb. 26, 1980] [“allows an 
investment adviser to bear expenses associated wth a merger or 
consolidation of investment companies”] 
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [Feb. 26, 1980] [“deems certain sales of 
redeemable shares made in connection with specified mergers or 
consolidations to comply with that rule”] 
 
§ 270.27f-1 Notice of right of withdrawal required to be mailed to periodic 
payment plan certificate holders and exemption from section 27(f) for 
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certain periodic payment plan certificates. [amended] [Mar. 20, 1980] 
[technical amendment; stated that form’s existing language might be 
“confusing”]  
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [Nov. 7, 1980] [“permit[s] open-end management 
investment companies to bear expenses associated with the distribution of 
their shares, if such companies comply with certain conditions and 
procedures”]  
 
§ 270.17d-3 Exemption relating to certain joint enterprises or 
arrangements concerning payment for distribution of shares of a registered 
open-end management investment company. [Nov. 7, 1980] [“exempt[ing] 
from the requirement of prior Commission approval, to the extent 
necessary, certain agreements between open-end management investment 
companies and their affiliated persons whereby investment company 
assets are used for distribution, if such agreements are entered into in 
compliance with the rule permitting such companies to bear their 
distribution expenses”] 
 
§ 270.17j-1 Certain unlawful acts, practices, or courses of business and 
requirements relating to codes of ethics with respect to registered 
investment companies. [Nov. 7, 1980] [“guidance” in implementing 
section 17(j) of 1940 Act; provides examples of prohibited activities] 
 
§ 270.3a-1 Certain prima facie investment companies. [Jan. 22, 1981] 
[“‘safe harbor’ rule which deems certain companies having more than 40 
percent of their assets invested in investment securities not to be 
investment companies”; codification of prior exemptive orders] 
 
§ 270.3a-2 Transient investment companies. [Jan. 22, 1981] [“deem[s] 
certain issuers, which otherwise would be transient investment companies, 
not to be investment companies for purposes of the [1940] Act”] 
 
§ 270.3a-3 Certain investment companies owned by companies which are 
not investment companies. [Jan. 22, 1981] [“‘safe harbor’ rule under the 
[1940 Act] to deem certain issuers having corporate parents as not being 
investment companies for purposes of the Act”; reflects prior exemptive 
orders and no-action letters] 
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§ 270.57b-1 Exemption for downstream affiliates of business development 
companies. [Mar. 13, 1981] [“permits certain transactions between a 
business development company and a company controlled by it or certain 
affiliated persons of such controlled company without requiring prior 
approval of the [SEC]”; “corrects the consequence of an inadvertent 
drafting error in section 57(b)(2) of the [1940] Act”] 
 
§ 270.60a-1 Exemption for certain business development companies. 
[Mar. 13, 1981] [“permits a business development company to acquire the 
securities of and operate a wholly-owned small business investment 
company”; “correct[s] the inadvertent result of the application of section 
12(d)(1) of the [1940] Act . . . to business development companies by 
section 60”]  
 
§ 270.17a-7 Exemption of certain purchase or sale transactions between an 
investment company and certain affiliated persons thereof. [Mar. 17, 1981] 
[exempting certain transactions from section 17(a) of 1940 Act] 
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. [July 14, 
1981] [“reconcile[s] most of the differences in the financial statement 
requirements of prospectuses and shareholder reports”; includes special 
provisions for investment companies in financial statement requirements 
and instructions, then makes them applicable to shareholder reports, and 
extends time in which they must be transmitted to shareholders; also 
provides new options for transmitting] 
 
§ 270.6c-6 Exemption for certain registered separate accounts and other 
persons. [Sept. 28, 1982] [“provides registered insurance company 
separate accounts and other persons with exemptive relief from certain 
provisions of the Act and rules thereunder to the extent necessary to 
permit them” to perform certain activities] 
 
§ 270.2a-4 Definition of “current net asset value” for use in computing 
periodically the current price of redeemable security. [amended] [Dec. 21, 
1982] [conformed Rule to amendment to “Article 6 of Regulation S-X 
regarding financial statements filed by registered investment companies,” 
which change was made to improve financial reporting] 
 
§ 270.6c-8 Exemptions for registered separate accounts to impose a 
deferred sales load and to deduct certain administrative charges. [Aug. 9, 
1983] [“provide[s] exemptive relief for registered insurance company 
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separate accounts and related persons from various provisions of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 with respect to variable annuity 
contracts participating in such accounts”; codifies prior exemptive orders] 
 
§ 270.11a-2 Offers of exchange by certain registered separate accounts or 
others the terms of which do not require prior Commission approval. 
[Aug. 10, 1983] [“permits a separate account designated as an ‘offering 
account,’ subject to certain conditions, to make an offer of exchange to 
securityholders of the offering account, or of other separate accounts 
having the same or an affiliated insurance company depositor or sponsor, 
without the terms of that offer first having been submitted to and approved 
by the [SEC]”] 
 
§ 270.18f-1 Exemption from certain requirements of section 18(f)(1) (of 
the Act) for registered open-end investment companies which have the 
right to redeem in kind. [amended] [Aug. 22, 1983] [“permit[s] registrants 
filing on Form N-1A to provide the disclosure required by those rules, at 
their discretion, in either the prospectus or Statement of Additional 
Information”]  
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [Aug. 22, 1983] [in connection with SEC adoption of Form N-
1A, “amended [Rule] to permit a registrant filing on Form N-1A to 
transmit to shareholders a copy of its currently effective prospectus or 
Statement of Additional Information, or both, as the equivalent of the 
annual and semi-annual reports required by the rule, provided those 
documents contain the information specified in rule 30d-1”] 
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [Sept. 29, 1983] [conform to new 1934 Act amendments 
primarily simplifying disclosure of executive compensation; changing 
word “remuneration” to “compensation”] 
 
§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of an indefinite 
number of certain investment company securities. [amended] [Nov. 18, 
1983] [requiring statement for issuer who filed a Rule 24f-2 declaration; 
but lessening consequences for failure to file on time] 
 
§ 270.6c-7 Exemptions from certain provisions of sections 22(e) and 27 
for registered separate accounts offering variable annuity contracts to 
participants in the Texas Optional Retirement Program. [Jan. 12, 1984] 
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[“providing certain exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 
for registered insurance company separate accounts offering variable 
annuity contracts”; codifying SEC standards] 
 
§ 270.6e-2 Exemptions for certain variable life insurance separate 
accounts. [amended] [Jan. 12, 1984] [expanding relief under Rule to other 
funds; parallel to relief given under companion release amendments to 
Rule 14a-2]  
 
§ 270.14a-2 Exemption from section 14(a) of the Act for certain registered 
separate accounts and their principal underwriters. [Jan. 12, 1984] 
[“expands the availability of the exemptive relief from the minimum net 
worth requirement of section 14(a) of the [1940] Act . . . provided to 
separate accounts by that rule and the availability of related exemptive 
relief from certain requirements of sections 15(a), 16(a), and 32(a) of the 
Act . . . provided by existing Rules 15a-3, 16a-1, and 32a-2 under the 
Act”]. 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [July 20, 1984] [redesignating 
and revising Rule 12d-1; “permits registered investment companies, or 
companies controlled by registered investment companies, to acquire 
securities issued by persons engaged directly or indirectly in securities 
related businesses under certain conditions”] 
 
§ 270.26a-1 Payment of administrative fees to the depositor or principal 
underwriter of a unit investment trust; exemptive relief for separate 
accounts. [Aug. 3, 1984] [“permit[s] the trustee of a unit investment trust 
to be reimbursed from trust assets for fees paid to the trust’s depositor for 
certain bookkeeping and other administrative services” and “provide[s] 
insurance company separate accounts that offer variable annuity contracts 
with an exemption to permit deduction of such fees from account assets”; 
codifies SEC’s “at cost” standard] 
 
§ 270.26a-2 Exemptions from certain provisions of sections 26 and 27 for 
registered separate accounts and others regarding custodianship of and 
deduction of certain fees and charges from the assets of such accounts. 
[Aug. 3, 1984] [“exemptive rule under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 for registered insurance company separate accounts offering variable 
annuity contracts”; codifying SEC standards] 
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§ 270.7d-1 Specification of conditions and arrangements for Canadian 
management investment companies requesting order permitting 
registration. [amended] [Sept. 14, 1984] [conforming amendment to reflect 
adoption of Rule 17f-5, below] 
 
§ 270.2a19-1 [Reserved] [Oct. 17, 1984] [renumbering and amending Rule 
2a-5; expanding the exemption from the definition of “interested person”] 
 
§ 270.6c-3 Exemptions for certain registered variable life insurance 
separate accounts. [Dec. 3, 1984] [“adopting, on a temporary basis, a rule 
that will provide insurance company separate accounts with exemptions 
from the [1940 Act] to the extent necessary to permit them to offer . . . 
flexible premium variable life insurance”] 
 
§ 270.3a-5 Exemption for subsidiaries organized to finance the operations 
of domestic or foreign companies. [Dec. 20, 1984] [“exempts finance 
subsidiaries of certain U.S. and foreign private issuers from the definition 
of investment company”] 
 
§ 270.30a-1 Annual reports for unit investment trusts. [amended] [Jan. 11, 
1985] [amendment to accommodate new Form N-SAR] 
 
§ 270.30b1-1 Semi-annual report for registered management investment 
companies. [Jan. 11, 1985] [new Rule to accommodate new Form N-SAR]  
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [Feb. 27, 1985] [deletes reference to removed 
Rule] 
 
§ 270.22d-1 Exemption from section 22(d) to permit sales of redeemable 
securities at prices which reflect sales loads set pursuant to a schedule. 
[amended] [Feb. 27, 1985] [broader exemption than prior Rule] 
 
§ 270.22d-2 Exemption from section 22(d) for certain registered separate 
accounts. [redesignated] [Feb. 27, 1985] 
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [June 13, 1985] [limits days on which 
companies are required to price redeemable securities] 
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§ 270.22e-2 Pricing of redemption requests in accordance with Rule 22c-
1. [June 13, 1985] “[provide[s] that an investment company will not have 
suspended the right of redemption if it prices a redemption request by 
computing net asset value under [amended Rule 22c-1]”; “clarifies” that a 
company is not required to price on days when pricing is not required]  
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [June 25, 1985] [“amended to add an item of Form N-3 to the 
items specified”; purpose of new forms is “to integrate and codify 
disclosure requirements for insurance company separate accounts that 
offer variable annuity contracts and to shorten and simplify the prospectus 
provided to investors, while making more extensive information available 
for those who request it”] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [July 9, 
1985] [“amended to replace references to form N-1Q with references to 
form N-SAR”; SEC referenced a commentator who said that 
“incorporation of form N-1Q into form N-SAR . . . would relieve 
investment companies of an unnecessary and duplicative filing 
requirement”] 
 
§ 270.30b1-1 Semi-annual report for registered management investment 
companies. [redesignated] [July 9, 1985] 
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [Oct. 22, 1985] [permitted use of “two day/five 
day” procedure”; part of SEC initiative to codify exemptive/interpretive 
positions] 
 
§ 270.2a41-1 Valuation of standby commitments by registered investment 
companies. [Mar. 21, 1986] [“allow[s] a registered investment company to 
assign a fair value of zero to a standby commitment” under certain 
conditions] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Mar. 21, 1986] 
[“allow[s] registered investment companies to acquire puts, as defined in 
amended Rule 2a-7, from persons engaged in securities related activities” 
if conditions are met] 
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§ 270.6e-3(T) Temporary exemptions for flexible premium variable life 
insurance separate accounts. [amended temporary rule] [Apr. 8, 1987] 
[“clarif[ies] and modif[ies]” conditions for exemption under Rule; 
clarifications tend to be less restrictive, as commenters mentioned by SEC 
are life insurance trade organization and counsel for a life insurance firm] 
 
§ 270.19b-1 Frequency of distribution of capital gains. [amended] [Nov. 5, 
1987] [“allow[s] registered investment companies to make an additional 
distribution of long-term capital gains for the purpose of not incurring a 
special excise tax”; to accommodate tax law changes that are more 
restrictive to investment companies and compliance with which would 
necessitate exemptive orders] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [Feb. 10, 1988] 
[“make[s] the uniform performance calculations and disclosure 
requirements of Rule 482 [as result of simultaneous amendment] 
applicable to fund sales literature”] 
 
§ 270.30b1-2 Semi-annual report for totally-owned registered 
management investment company subsidiary of registered management 
investment company. [amendment] [Mar. 13, 1989] [“to correct erroneous 
references”] 
 
§ 270.30b1-3 Transition reports. [Mar. 13, 1989] [“to govern the reporting 
requirements for investment companies that change their fiscal year end”; 
“codifies the staff practice” of requiring filing at certain points] 
 
§ 270.32a-3 Exemption from provision of section 32(a)(1) regarding the 
time period during which a registered management investment company 
must select an independent public accountant. [July 28, 1989] [“expands 
the time period during which certain registered management investment 
companies must select an independent public accountant”] 
 
§ 270.11a-3 Offers of exchange by open-end investment companies other 
than separate accounts. [Aug. 24, 1989] [“permits a mutual fund or its 
principal underwriter to make certain exchange offers to the fund’s 
shareholders or to shareholders of another fund in the same group of 
funds”] 
 
§ 270.2a41-1 Valuation of standby commitments by registered investment 
companies. [amended] [Feb. 27, 1991] [accommodate simultaneous 
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amendments to Rule 2a-7 which “tighten[s] the risk-limiting conditions” 
of the Rule; amendments to Rule 2a-7 also require additional disclosure 
and restrict use of term “money market fund”] 
 
§ 270.30h-1 Applicability of section 16 of the Exchange Act to section 
30(h). [originally § 270.30f-1] [amended] [Feb. 21, 1991] [to 
accommodate amendments to Rules under section 16, which amendments 
“achieve greater clarity, rescind unnecessary requirements, streamline 
mandated procedures, increase compliance with the reporting provisions 
of the rules, and enhance consistency with the statutory purposes of 
section 16”] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Feb. 27, 1991] 
[accommodate simultaneous amendments to Rule 2a-7 which “tighten[s] 
the risk-limiting conditions” of the Rule; amendments to Rule 2a-7 also 
require additional disclosure and restrict use of term “money market 
fund”] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Feb. 27, 
1991] [accommodate simultaneous amendments to Rule 2a-7 which 
“tighten[s] the risk-limiting conditions” of the Rule; amendments to Rule 
2a-7 also require additional disclosure and restrict use of term “money 
market fund”] 
 
§ 270.3a-5 Exemption for subsidiaries organized to finance the operations 
of domestic or foreign companies. [amended] [Nov. 4, 1991] [exempting 
“holding companies and finance subsidiaries of foreign banks and 
insurance companies” from definition of investment company] 
 
§ 270.3a-6 Foreign banks and foreign insurance companies. [Nov. 4, 
1991] [“excepting foreign banks and foreign insurance companies from 
the definition of the term ‘investment company’ for all purposes under the 
Act”] 
 
§ 270.12d2-1 Definition of insurance company for purposes of sections 
12(d)(2) and 12(g) of the Act. [Nov. 4, 1991] [Rule 12d-1 was rescinded 
as no longer necessary (because of adoption of Rule 3a-6), but Rule 12d-1 
was adopted to maintain one restriction of Rule 12d-1 (the Rule “limits the 
acquisition by an investment company of securities of a United States 
insurance company”)]  
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§ 270.20a-1 Solicitation of proxies, consents and authorizations. 
[amended] [Jan. 10, 1992] [to accommodate revisions to the proxy and 
information statement rules; these revisions eliminate “regulatory gaps” 
(i.e., impose new requirements)] 
 
§ 270.3a-7 Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities. [Nov. 27, 1992] [excludes 
structured financings from definition of investment company] 
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [Dec. 1, 1992] [“revises the item number of Form N-2 to which 
the rule applies”] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Apr. 12, 
1993] [“technical amendments” that “exclude from the updating 
requirements performance information contained in periodic reports to 
shareholders”]  
 
§ 270.23c-3 Repurchase offers by closed-end companies. [Apr. 14, 1993] 
[increases the ability of certain closed-end companies to repurchase stock] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Apr. 26, 
1993] [correction; material was “inadvertently omitted”] 
 
§ 270.23c-3 Repurchase offers by closed-end companies. [amended] [May 
21, 1993] [correction]  
 
§ 270.2a3-1 Investment company limited partners not deemed affiliated 
persons. [Aug. 31, 1993] [“except[s] from the definition of affiliated 
person in section 2(a)(3) investors that are affiliated persons under section 
2(a)(3)(D) solely because of their status as limited partners of a limited 
partnership investment company,” codifying exemptive orders] 
 
§ 270.2a19-2 Investment company general partners not deemed interested 
persons. [Aug. 31, 1993] [“conditionally excepts from the definition of 
interested person in section 2(a)(19) . . . general partners of investment 
companies organized in limited partnership form,” codifying exemptive 
orders] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Sept. 23, 1993] 
[“eliminate[s] the qualitative conditions currently imposed by the rule on 
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acquisitions by registered investment companies of the securities of 
domestic and foreign securities related businesses”; i.e., facilitates 
exemptive relief under the Rule] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [Sept. 24, 
1993] [“The amended rules no longer require directors to review certain 
procedures and arrangements annually, and require instead that directors 
make and approve changes only when necessary. The amendments are 
intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment company boards by 
substituting more meaningful requirements for an annual review 
requirement, which is not necessary to protect investors.”] 
 
§ 270.17a-7 Exemption of certain purchase or sale transactions between an 
investment company and certain affiliated persons thereof. [amended] 
[Sept. 24, 1993] [“The amended rules no longer require directors to review 
certain procedures and arrangements annually, and require instead that 
directors make and approve changes only when necessary. The 
amendments are intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment 
company boards by substituting more meaningful requirements for an 
annual review requirement, which is not necessary to protect investors.”] 
 
§ 270.17e-1 Brokerage transactions on a securities exchange. [amended] 
[Sept. 24, 1993] [“The amended rules no longer require directors to review 
certain procedures and arrangements annually, and require instead that 
directors make and approve changes only when necessary. The 
amendments are intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment 
company boards by substituting more meaningful requirements for an 
annual review requirement, which is not necessary to protect investors.”] 
 
§ 270.22c-1 Pricing of redeemable securities for distribution, redemption 
and repurchase. [amended] [Sept. 24, 1993] [“The amended rules no 
longer require directors to review certain procedures and arrangements 
annually, and require instead that directors make and approve changes 
only when necessary. The amendments are intended to enhance the 
effectiveness of investment company boards by substituting more 
meaningful requirements for an annual review requirement, which is not 
necessary to protect investors.”] 
 
§ 270.2a19-2 Investment company general partners not deemed interested 
persons. [amended] [Dec. 6, 1993] [correction] 
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§ 270.2a19-2 Investment company general partners not deemed interested 
persons. [amended] [Apr. 1, 1994] [correction] 
 
§ 270.6e-3(T) Temporary exemptions for flexible premium variable life 
insurance separate accounts. [amended] [Aug. 24, 1994] [“technical and 
conforming amendments”; accompanying amendments “expand the 
conditions under which post-effective amendments filed by investment 
companies are permitted to become effective automatically”] 
 
§ 270.20a-1 Solicitation of proxies, consents and authorizations. 
[amended] [Oct. 19, 1994] [“minor technical amendments”; accompanying 
amendments “update” proxy rules applicable to funds; place greater 
emphasis on “directly relevant” information and eliminating disclosure of 
less “pertinent” information]  
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [Oct. 19, 1994] [“require[s] a report of voting results in the 
annual or semi-annual report to shareholders”; other technical/conforming 
changes regarding the updates to proxy rules in the last entry] 
 
§ 270.6c-10 Exemption for certain open-end management investment 
companies to impose deferred sales loads. [Mar. 2, 1995] [allows mutual 
funds to impose contingent deferred sales loads] 
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Mar. 2, 1995] [[1] “provides that if a 
plan covers more than one class of shares, the provisions of the plan must 
be severable for each class, and any action taken on the plan must be taken 
separately for each class”; [2] “requires shareholder approval by the 
outstanding voting securities of each separate class when Rule 12b-1 
requires that a plan for the distribution of securities be approved by a 
majority of the fund’s outstanding voting securities”; [3] cross-references 
Rule 18f-3; provides that “under § 270.18f-3(e)(2), any shareholder vote 
on a plan of a target class must also require a vote of any purchase class”] 
 
§ 270.18f-3 Multiple class companies. [Mar. 2, 1995] [“permit[s] [mutual 
funds] to issue multiple classes of voting stock representing interests in the 
same portfolio”] 
 
§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of certain 
investment company securities. [amended] [Sept. 11, 1995] [(1) stating 
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that a Rule 24b-2 Notice is deemed “timely filed” if timely transmitted to 
an appropriate entity that guarantees delivery by the appropriate date; a 
more lenient standard; (2) requiring a fund to include DRIP shares in using 
the Rule’s netting provision; (3) “remov[ing] the requirement that a fund 
file its final Rule 24f-2 Notice prior to ceasing operations”; substituting a 
more lenient standard; (4) changing time periods for filing from being 
denominated in months to being denominated in days to be consistent with 
other timing provisions]  
 
§ 270.2a-7 Money market funds. [amended] [Mar. 28, 1996] [additional 
limitations on money market funds “to tighten the risk-limiting conditions 
of the rule”] 
 
§ 270.2a41-1 Valuation of standby commitments by registered investment 
companies. [amended] [Mar. 28, 1996] [accommodation of amendments to 
Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Mar. 28, 1996] 
[accommodation of amendments to Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.17a-9 Purchase of certain securities from a money market fund by 
an affiliate, or an affiliate of an affiliate. [Mar. 28, 1996] [“exempt[s] from 
section 17(a) of the 1940 Act the purchase of a security that is no longer 
an eligible security”] 
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [May 15, 1996] [adaptation to electronic media; substitution of 
word “transmitted” for “mailed”] 
 
§ 270.30e-2 Reports to shareholders of unit investment trusts. [amended] 
[May 15, 1996] [adaptation to electronic media; substitution of word 
“transmitted” for “mailed” and similar minor changes] 
 
§ 270.6c-10 Exemption for certain open-end management investment 
companies to impose deferred sales loads. [amended] [Sept. 17, 1996] 
[“allow[s] mutual funds to offer investors a wider variety of deferred sales 
loads, including installment loads, and eliminate[s] certain requirements”] 
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§ 270.11a-3 Offers of exchange by open-end investment companies other 
than separate accounts. [amended] [Sept. 17, 1996] [“conforming 
amendment” to amendment to Rule 6c-10] 
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Sept. 17, 1996] [“technical amendment”; 
“[s]hareholder approval of a rule 12b-1 plan is unnecessary when the plan 
is adopted prior to a fund’s initial public offering”]  
 
§ 270.3a-4 Status of investment advisory programs. [Mar. 31, 1997] 
[“provide[s] a nonexclusive safe harbor from the definition of investment 
company for certain programs under which investment advisory services 
are provided on a discretionary basis to a large number of advisory clients 
having relatively small amounts to invest”] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [Aug. 7, 
1997] [“increase[s] the percentage of an underwriting that investment 
companies having the same investment adviser may purchase in reliance 
on the rule, and expand[s] the scope of the rule to include securities of 
certain foreign and domestic issuers that are not registered with the 
Commission under [the 1933 Act]”] 
 
§ 270.24e-1 Filing of certain prospectuses as post-effective amendments to 
registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933. [amended] [Sept. 
12, 1997] [deleted as unnecessary following 1996 Act amendment to 
section 24(f); see entry for Rule 24f-2 for the same date] 
 
§ 270.24f-2 Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of certain 
investment company securities. [amended] [Sept. 12, 1997] [implements 
1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act, specifically 
amendments to section 24(f), which provides a “new, simpler system” of 
registration: (1) eliminating advantage of registration of “prepaid shares,” 
therefore adopting a more lenient standard; (2) clarifying merger provision 
of Rule, but in the form of mandatory rules; (3) extension of an exclusion 
from sales to prevent “double payment,” to funds selling shares to a UIT; 
however, (4) the amendment required Form 24f-2 to be filed within 90 
days after the end of the fiscal year, not 180 days as before; thus, the 
amendment provides a more restrictive rule]  
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§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Oct. 3, 1997] [“technical amendment”; 
“codifies prior interpretations that a rule 12b-1 plan also may cover more 
than one series or portfolio under the same conditions applicable when a 
plan covers more than one class”; therefore, amendment provides a less 
restrictive rule than text of previous version] 
 
§ 270.18f-3 Multiple class companies. [amended] [Oct. 3, 1997] [“The 
amendments expand the specified methods a multiple class fund may use 
to allocate among its classes income, gains and losses (including 
unrealized appreciation or depreciation), and expenses not allocated to a 
particular class. The amendments also permit a fund to use any other 
allocation method that the fund’s board of directors determines is fair to 
the shareholders of each class. In addition, the amendments clarify the 
shareholder voting rights provision of the rule.” The clarification provides 
that a certain restrictive provision only applies under some circumstances.] 
 
§ 270.2a-7 Money market funds. [amended] [Dec. 9, 1997] [“[t]echnical 
amendments”; “revise terminology used in the rule to reflect common 
market usage and resolve certain interpretive issues under the rule”; 
clarifications appear to be to meet concerns of industry] 
 
§ 270.17a-9 Purchase of certain securities from a money market fund by 
an affiliate, or an affiliate of an affiliate. [amended] [Dec. 9, 1997] 
[conforming amendment to amendments to Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.2a41-1 Valuation of standby commitments by registered investment 
companies. [amended] [Dec. 9, 1997] [conforming amendment to 
amendments to Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Dec. 9, 1997] 
[conforming amendment to amendments to Rule 2a-7] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Dec. 9, 
1997] [clarifying rules that are more restrictive] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Mar. 
23, 1998] [conforming amendment to new rule under 1933 Act that would 
allow funds to offer a “profile”] 
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§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [May 29, 1998] [extension of compliance date for 1997 
amendments; although 1997 amendments were less restrictive for funds, 
unanticipated problems surfaced for funds attempting to comply] 
 
§ 270.17f-5 Custody of investment company assets outside the United 
States. [amended] [Feb. 3, 1999] [extension of compliance date; allows 
companies to comply with either former or amended rule in interim] 
 
§ 270.8f-1 Deregistration of certain registered investment companies. 
[amended] [Apr. 21, 1999] [“expand[s] the types of circumstances in 
which a fund may use Form N-8F to apply for a deregistration order”; 
however, accompanying amendment to corresponding form requires form 
to be filed electronically] 
 
§ 270.17j-1 Personal investment activities of investment company 
personnel. [amended] [Aug. 27, 1999] [“The amendments will increase the 
oversight role of an investment company’s board of directors with respect 
to codes of ethics, improve the manner in which investment company 
personnel report their personal securities holdings, and require prior 
approval of investments in initial public offerings and certain limited 
offerings by certain investment company personnel (including portfolio 
managers). Related amendments to disclosure forms will require 
investment companies to provide information about their policies 
concerning personal investment activities in their registration statements.”] 
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[amended] [Nov. 16, 1999] [allows single prospectus to be sent to two or 
more investors at same address; “provide[s] greater convenience for 
investors and cost savings for issuers by reducing the number of duplicate 
documents that investors receive”] 
 
§ 270.30e-2 Reports to shareholders of unit investment trusts. [amended] 
[Nov. 16, 1999] [allows single prospectus to be sent to two or more 
investors at same address; “provide[s] greater convenience for investors 
and cost savings for issuers by reducing the number of duplicate 
documents that investors receive”] 
 
§ 270.15a-4 Temporary exemption for certain investment advisers. 
[amended] [Dec. 6, 1999] [“expand[s] the circumstances in which the 
exemption provided by the rule is available, to include a merger or similar 
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business combination involving an investment company’s adviser”; “also 
lengthen[s] the maximum duration of the temporary contract”] 
 
§ 270.17j-1 Personal investment activities of investment company 
personnel. [corrected] [Mar. 10, 2000] [correction of error] 
 
§ 270.7d-1 Specification of conditions and arrangements for Canadian 
management investment companies requesting order permitting 
registration. [amended] [May 3, 2000] [conforming amendments to Rule 
17f-7 and amendments to 17f-5] 
 
§ 270.7d-2 Definition of “public offering” as used in section 7(d) of the 
Act with respect to certain Canadian tax-deferred retirement savings 
accounts. [June 15, 2000] [“permit foreign investment companies to offer 
securities to those U.S. participants and sell securities to their Canadian 
retirement accounts without registering under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940”] 
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APPENDIX D 
 
2001–present 
 
DEFINITIONAL: 4 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] 
[definitions of terms from new rules] 
 
§ 270.0-1 Definition of terms used in this part. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] 
[new definitions to accommodate other changes] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] [68 
Fed. Reg. 36,671, June 18, 2003] [“[t]o coordinate [certain] rules”; 
definition of a term moved from this Rule to another] 
 
§ 270.30a-3 Controls and procedures. [amended] [Mar. 9, 2004] [broadens 
a definition to include information required by new Form N-Q] 
 
FORMS AND FILING: 5 
§ 270.8b-11 Number of copies; signatures; binding. [amended] [Apr. 23, 
2002] [“conforming amendment[]” to form amendments which tailor 
disclosure to variable life insurance policies]  
 
§ 270.8b-12 Requirements as to paper, printing and language. [amended] 
[Apr. 23, 2002] [“conforming amendment[]” to form amendments which 
tailor disclosure to variable life insurance policies]  
 
§ 270.8b-15 Amendments. [amended] [Feb. 3, 2003] [applying 
certification requirement to “amendments of certified shareholder reports 
on Form N-CSR”] 
 
§ 270.8b-15 Amendments. [amended] [June 18, 2003] [requiring 
amendments to reports required to include the certification required by 
amended Rule]  
 
§ 270.8b-15 Amendments. [amended] [Mar. 1, 2004] [extension of 
compliance date] 
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BOOKS AND RECORDS: 3 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Jan. 16, 
2001] [amended to conform to above amendments] 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [May 30, 
2001] [“permit[ting] funds and advisers to keep all of their records in an 
electronic format”] 
 
§ 270.31a-2 Records to be preserved by registered investment companies, 
certain majority-owned subsidiaries thereof, and other persons having 
transactions with registered investment companies. [amended] [Aug. 2, 
2004] [“amending [Rule] . . . to require that funds retain copies of the 
written materials that directors consider in approving an advisory 
contract”] 
 
CUSTODY: 1 
§ 270.17f-4 Custody of investment company assets with a securities 
depository. [amended] [Feb. 20, 2003] [“permit[s] additional types of 
investment companies to rely on the rule, . . . allow[s] depositories to 
perform additional functions under the rule,” and eliminates certain 
specific requirements and replaces them with a “due care” rule] 
 
SUBSTANTIVE EXEMPTIONS AND REGULATION: 74 
§ 270.2a19-1 [Reserved] [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [rescinded as no 
longer necessary; new standards for independence in Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act eliminated need for exemptive relief of Rule]  
 
§ 270.2a19-3 Certain investment company directors not considered 
interested persons because of ownership of index fund securities [Jan. 16, 
2001] [“conditionally exempts an individual from being disqualified as an 
independent director solely because he or she owns shares of an index 
fund that invests in the investment adviser or underwriter of the fund, or 
their controlling persons”] 
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§ 270.10e-1 Death, disqualification, or bona fide resignation of directors. 
[Jan. 16, 2001] [“temporarily suspends the board composition 
requirements of the Act and our rules, if a fund fails to meet those 
requirements because of the death, disqualification, or bona fide 
resignation of a director”] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [Jan. 16, 
2001] [amends exemptive rule to add additional requirements for funds 
relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule 
to add additional requirements for funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.15a-4 Temporary exemption for certain investment advisers. 
[amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule to add additional 
requirements for funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.17a-7 Exemption of certain purchase or sale transactions between an 
investment company and certain affiliated persons thereof. [amended] 
[Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule to add additional requirements for 
funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.17a-8 Mergers of affiliated companies. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] 
[amends exemptive rule to add additional requirements for funds relying 
on rule]  
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive 
rule to add additional requirements for funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.17e-1 Brokerage transactions on a securities exchange. [amended] 
[Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule to add additional requirements for 
funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.17g-1 Bonding of officers and employees of registered management 
investment companies. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule 
to add additional requirements for funds relying on rule]  
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§ 270.18f-3 Multiple class companies. [amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amends 
exemptive rule to add additional requirements for funds relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.23c-3 Repurchase offers by closed-end companies. [amended] [Jan. 
16, 2001] [amends exemptive rule to add additional requirements for funds 
relying on rule]  
 
§ 270.30e-1 Reports to stockholders of management companies. 
[redesignated and amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amended to conform to 
amendments to exemptive rules, which amendments were adopted same 
day] 
 
§ 270.30e-2 Reports to shareholders of unit investment trusts. 
[redesignated and amended] [Jan. 16, 2001] [amended to conform to above 
amendments] 
 
§ 270.32a-4 Independent audit committees. [Jan. 16, 2001] [“exempting 
funds from the Act’s requirement that shareholders vote on the selection of 
the fund’s independent public accountant if the fund has an audit 
committee composed wholly of independent directors”] 
 
§ 270.35d-1 Investment company names. [Feb. 1, 2001] [provides that 
certain names are “materially deceptive and misleading” for purposes of 
section 35(d)] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Feb. 5, 
2001] [requires disclosure of after-tax returns to investors] 
 
§ 270.35d-1 Investment company names. [corrected] [Mar. 14, 2001] 
[correction of typographical error] 
 
§ 270.2a-7 Money market funds. [amended] [July 11, 2001] [“conforming 
amendmen[t]” to accommodate new Rule 5b-3 below] 
 
§ 270.5b-3 Acquisition of repurchase agreement or refunded security 
treated as acquisition of underlying securities. [July 11, 2001] [“permits a 
fund . . . to use ‘look-through treatment’ regarding certain repurchase 
agreements and investments in government bonds”; “codifies and updates 
staff interpretive and no-action letters”] 
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§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [July 11, 2001] 
[“conforming amendmen[t]” to accommodate new Rule 5b-3 above] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [May 8, 
2002] [“amendments expand the exemption provided by the rule”] 
 
§ 270.3a-1 Certain prima facie investment companies. [amended] [June 
28, 2002] [“technical amendment[]” to conform references to National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act]  
 
§ 270.3a-2 Transient investment companies. [amended] [June 28, 2002] 
[“technical amendment[]” to conform references to National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.3a-3 Certain investment companies owned by companies which are 
not investment companies. [amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical 
amendment[]” to conform references to National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.3a-5 Exemption for subsidiaries organized to finance the operations 
of domestic or foreign companies. [amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical 
amendment[]” to conform references to National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.3a-6 Foreign banks and foreign insurance companies. [amended] 
[June 28, 2002] [“technical amendment[]” to conform references to 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.6c-6 Exemption for certain registered separate accounts and other 
persons. [amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical amendment[]” to conform 
references to National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] 
 
§ 270.6e-2 Exemptions for certain variable life insurance separate 
accounts. [amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical amendment[]” to 
conform references to National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 
1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] 
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§ 270.6e-3(T) Temporary exemptions for flexible premium variable life 
insurance separate accounts. [amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical 
amendment[]” to conform references to National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.30h-1 Applicability of section 16 of the Exchange Act to section 
30(h). [redesignated and amended] [June 28, 2002] [“technical 
amendment[]” to conform references to National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]  
 
§ 270.17a-8 Mergers of affiliated companies. [amended] [July 24, 2002] 
[“amendments expand the types of business combinations permitted by the 
rule”] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [Sept. 9, 2002] 
[requiring certification of disclosure in annual and semi-annual reports; 
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement] 
 
§ 270.30b1-1 Semi-annual report for registered management investment 
companies. [amended] [Sept. 9, 2002] [renaming of Rule] 
 
§ 270.30b1-3 Transition reports. [amended] [Sept. 9, 2002] [amending 
Rule to provide that transition report must include disclosure required by 
Rule 30a-2, adopted at the same time]  
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [Jan. 22, 
2003] [expansion of exemption] 
 
§ 270.12d3-1 Exemption of acquisitions of securities issued by persons 
engaged in securities related businesses. [amended] [Jan. 22, 2003] 
[expansion of exemption] 
 
§ 270.17a-6 Exemption for transactions with portfolio affiliates. 
[amended] [Jan. 22, 2003] [expansion of exemption] 
 
§ 270.17a-10 Exemption for transactions with certain subadvisory 
affiliates. [Jan. 22, 2003] [new exemption] 
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§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Jan. 22, 2003] [expansion of 
exemption] 
 
§ 270.17e-1 Brokerage transactions on a securities exchange. [amended] 
[Jan. 22, 2003] [expansion of exemption] 
 
§ 270.30a-1 Annual reports for unit investment trusts. [amended] [Feb. 3, 
2003] [“technical conforming amendment”; “delete[s] the language . . . 
stating that a registered management investment company required to file 
an annual report pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act 
and section 30(a) of the Investment Company Act shall be deemed to have 
satisfied its requirement to file an annual report by the filing of semi-
annual reports on Form N-SAR”] 
 
§ 270.30a-3 Controls and procedures. [Feb. 3, 2003] [“requires registered 
management investment companies to maintain, and regularly evaluate the 
effectiveness of, controls and procedures designed to ensure that the 
information required in filings on Form N-CSR is recorded, processed, 
summarized, and reported on a timely basis”] 
 
§ 270.30b1-3 Transition reports. [amended] [Feb. 3, 2003] [“technical 
conforming amendments . . . to remove the reference to Form N-SAR”] 
 
§ 270.30b2-1 Filing of reports to stockholders. [amended] [Feb. 3, 2003] 
[“require[s] a registered management investment company to file a report 
with the Commission on new Form N-CSR (“certified shareholder report”) 
containing [certain information]”] 
 
§ 270.30d-1 Filing of copies of reports to shareholders. [Feb. 3, 2003] 
[“designat[es] reports on Form N-CSR as periodic reports filed with the 
Commission under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act”] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] [Feb. 
3, 2003] [amended “to require Form N-CSR to include the certification 
required by section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”] 
 
§ 270.30b1-4 Report of proxy voting record. [Feb. 7, 2003] [“require[s] a 
registered investment adviser that exercises voting authority over client 
proxies to adopt [certain] policies and procedures” and to make certain 
disclosures and maintain certain records] 
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§ 270.0-11 Customer identification programs. [May 9, 2003] [adopted to 
cross-reference a new regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 103.131, adopted jointly by 
the Treasury and the SEC, which in turn implements 31 U.S.C. § 5318(1), 
part of the USA PATRIOT Act, which requires the agencies to require 
customer identification programs that meet certain requirements] 
 
§ 270.30a-3 Controls and procedures. [amended] [June 18, 2003] 
[“technical changes” to parallel rules for operating companies] 
 
§ 270.3a-8 Certain research and development companies. [June 20, 2003] 
[“provides a nonexclusive safe harbor from the definition of investment 
company for certain bona fide research and development companies”] 
 
§ 270.34b-1 Sales literature deemed to be misleading. [amended] [Oct. 6, 
2003] [(1) “clarif[ies] that requirements apply to supplemental sales 
literature; (2) note “clarif[ies] that compliance with [Rule 34b-1] does not 
relieve the fund, underwriter, or dealer of any obligations with respect to 
the advertisement under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws”; however, SEC notes that it “did not intend to alter existing 
standards of liability”]  
 
§ 270.23c-1 Repurchase of securities by closed-end companies. [amended] 
[Nov. 17, 2003] [“eliminating the current requirement for closed-end 
funds to disclose information regarding privately negotiated repurchases 
of their securities on Form N-23C-1”; also “conforming technical 
amendment” to conform to elimination of Form N-23C-1] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] 
[Nov. 28, 2003] [“conforming change” to reflect renumbering of items of 
Form N-CSR to accommodate a new item which requires a new 
disclosure] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [corrected] 
[Dec. 11, 2003] [document republished because text was left out] 
 
§ 270.38a-1 Compliance procedures and practices of certain investment 
companies. [Dec. 24, 2003] [requires adoption of compliance programs] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] 
[Mar. 1, 2004] [extension of compliance date] 
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§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] 
[Mar. 9, 2004] [to accommodate other amendments requiring additional 
disclosure] 
 
§ 270.30b1-5 Quarterly report. [Mar. 9, 2004] [requires quarterly report 
disclosing portfolio holdings after first and third quarters] 
 
§ 270.30d-1 Filing of copies of reports to shareholders. [amended] [Mar. 
9, 2004] [requiring filing of new Form N-Q as requirement to meet 
requirements of Rule]  
 
§ 270.17j-1 Personal investment activities of investment company 
personnel. [amended] [July 9, 2004] [“conform[s] certain provisions to” 
new Rule requiring codes of ethics] 
 
§ 270.10f-3. Exemption for the acquisition of securities during the 
existence of an underwriting or selling syndicate. [amended] [Aug. 2, 
2004] [requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of 
exemption] 
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain 
governance practices” as condition of exemption] 
 
§ 270.15a-4 Temporary exemption for certain investment advisers. 
[amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain governance practices” as 
condition of exemption] 
 
§ 270.17a-7 Exemption of certain purchase or sale transactions between an 
investment company and certain affiliated persons thereof. [amended] 
[Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of 
exemption] 
 
§ 270.17a-8 Mergers of affiliated companies. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] 
[requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of exemption] 
 
§ 270.17d-1 Applications regarding joint enterprises or arrangements and 
certain profit-sharing plans. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain 
governance practices” as condition of exemption] 
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§ 270.17e-1 Brokerage transactions on a securities exchange. [amended] 
[Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of 
exemption] 
 
§ 270.17g-1 Bonding of officers and employees of registered management 
investment companies. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] [requiring “certain 
governance practices” as condition of exemption] 
 
§ 270.18f-3 Multiple class companies. [amended] [Aug. 2, 2004] 
[requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of exemption] 
 
§ 270.23c-3 Repurchase offers by closed-end companies. [amended] [Aug. 
2, 2004] [requiring “certain governance practices” as condition of 
exemption] 
 
§ 270.30a-2 Certification of Form N-CSR and Form N-Q. [amended] 
[Aug. 27, 2004] [accommodates amendments to forms requiring greater 
disclosure regarding portfolio managers] 
 
§ 270.12b-1 Distribution of shares by registered open-end management 
investment company. [amended] [Sept. 9, 2004] [“prohibits funds from 
paying for the distribution of their shares with brokerage commissions”] 
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